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ARTICLES 
BEYOND DOMA: CHOICE OF STATE LAW 
IN FEDERAL STATUTES 
William Baude* 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) has been abandoned by the executive 
and held unconstitutional by courts, so it is time to think about what will be left in 
its place. Federal law frequently asks whether a couple is married. But marriage 
is primarily a creature of state law, and states differ as to who may marry. The 
federal government has no system for deciding what state’s law governs a mar-
riage, though more than a thousand legal provisions look to marital status, more 
than a hundred thousand same-sex couples report being married, and many of 
those marriages ultimately cross state lines. Unless a federal choice-of-law sys-
tem is designed, DOMA’s demise will lead to chaos.  
This Article argues that such a system can and should be designed. Because 
the underlying choice-of-law problem is ultimately a problem of statutory inter-
pretation, Congress can and should replace DOMA with a clear choice-of-law 
rule. Failing that, federal courts can and should develop a common law rule of 
their own—they are not (and should not be) bound by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. The Article further ar-
gues that different institutions should solve the problem differently: If Congress 
acts, it should recognize all marriages that were valid in the state where they took 
place. If, instead, the courts create a common law rule, they should recognize all 
marriages that are valid in the couple’s domicile. 
The implications of this argument run far beyond the demise of DOMA. In 
all areas of what is here called “interstitial law,” federal interpretive institutions 
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can and should devise a set of choice-of-law rules for federal law that draws up-
on state law, and what set of rules is proper may well depend on who adopts 
them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) may be gone soon, and it is time to 
think about what will be left in its place. On February 23, 2011, Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder announced that the administration would no longer defend the 
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA—which defines marriage, for purposes 
of federal law, to exclude same-sex couples—because “Section 3 of DOMA, as 
applied to legally married same-sex couples, . . . is . . . unconstitutional.”1 
 
 1. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 
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Holder explained that the administration would keep enforcing DOMA for 
now. But suppose that DOMA is indeed repealed or definitively invalidated. If 
so, federal law will no longer define marriage as being between one man and 
one woman. What will define marriage, and what will that definition be? 
Under the Holder view, marriage will be defined by reference to state law, 
because “Section 3 of DOMA may not be constitutionally applied to same-sex 
couples whose marriages are legally recognized under state law.”2 This seems 
sensible enough. If DOMA is gone, state law is the logical place to turn to see 
whether a couple is validly married. But Holder did not specify which state’s 
law is relevant, and the choice matters. Some states allow same-sex couples to 
marry; others do not. Some states recognize foreign same-sex marriages; others 
do not. There are many same-sex marriages, and many of them cross state 
lines: according to the last census, more than 130,000 same-sex couples de-
scribe themselves as married,3 and every year at least 1.5% of the general 
population moves from one state to another.4  
When a marriage crosses state lines—for example, when a same-sex cou-
ple marries in one state and later moves to another—it is not obvious which 
state’s law should control. Should it be the place where the marriage was cele-
brated? Where the couple lived at the time? Where they live now? Something 
else? It turns out that there are several different approaches to answering this 
choice-of-law question, and it is not clear which one the administration expects 
courts to use. Amidst the heat and light generated by the administration’s ac-
tions, the actual meaning of its position has been ignored. 
This Article attempts to solve the question left open by the possible demise 
of DOMA, and thereby solve a much broader problem of federal choice of law: 
How should the federal government decide what state’s law applies when a 
federal statute incorporates state law? Much has been written about state con-
flicts doctrines generally (what I call first-order conflicts) and conflicts over 
same-sex marriage specifically. But remarkably little has been written about the 
second-order conflicts problem of how the federal government should make 
choices among state laws. Henry Hart and Paul Mishkin discussed the general 
 
U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a 
report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Jus-
tice . . . determines . . . to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from 
defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitution-
ality of any provision of any Federal statute . . . .”). 
 2. DOMA Letter, supra note 1. 
 3. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-
Sex Married Couples (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/ 
operations/cb11-cn181.html. 
 4. See Annual Geographical Mobility Rates, by Type of Movement: 1947-2009, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU 2-4 (May 2010), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab 
-a-1.pdf. 
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choice-of-law problem, but did not propose how to solve it.5 More recent arti-
cles focus on one narrow slice of federal law, such as bankruptcy6 or immigra-
tion,7 or else fail to observe the serious choice-of-law problem in the first 
place.8  
DOMA’s possible demise provides occasion to examine this problem. 
Without DOMA, federal law will turn to state law to determine when a same-
sex marriage is valid, forcing the federal courts to wade into the disputes over 
marriage and choice of law. Because of the large number of mobile same-sex 
marriages and federal laws that refer to marital status, those choice-of-law cas-
es will be numerous. And because of the wide divergence in state marriage 
laws, those conflicts will be difficult to dodge.  
I argue that the problem can be resolved. Ideally, the political branches 
would replace DOMA with a clear choice-of-law rule. But there is reason to 
doubt that will happen. Alternatively, federal courts can and should create a 
federal common law rule. I further argue that how these institutions should 
solve the choice-of-law problem depends on which institution does so. Con-
gress should pass a law providing that a marriage is valid for purposes of feder-
al law if it was valid in the state where it occurred. If Congress doesn’t act, the 
courts should hold a couple to be married if the couple’s home state does. The 
differing rules reflect the differing roles of these institutions.  
This resolution goes beyond the marriage context. In proposing a solution 
to the DOMA problem, I aim to make two contributions to choice-of-law doc-
trine more broadly. Fifty years ago, Henry Hart asked: 
When Congress does remit matters to state law . . . does it have the power to 
say which state’s law? If, as almost invariably happens, it has not said express-
ly which state law is to govern, should the federal courts work out a federal 
 
 5. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. 
L. REV. 489, 498 (1954); Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence 
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 
797, 806 (1957); see also Note, Applicability of State Conflicts Rules When Issues of State 
Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1228 (1955) (noting the prob-
lem and discussing “four relevant considerations” in crafting a solution in any given substan-
tive area). 
 6. See Robert B. Chapman, Profoundly Unwise and Even Irresponsible Uncertainty: 
Some Preliminary Questions as to the Effect of the Defense of Marriage Act on Marital Sta-
tus in Bankruptcy for Same-Sex Couples Validly Married Under State Law, 14 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. 3 (2005); John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. 
REV. 531 (1989); Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-
Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2006). 
 7. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Im-
plications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 537 (2010).  
 8. See Mark Strasser, The Legal Landscape Post-DOMA, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
153, 176-77 (2009).  
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answer? Or should they leave it to the plaintiff, within the limits of the appli-
cable venue and process requirements, to determine the answer for himself?9 
Hart lamented that “[t]his distinct and vital aspect of the problem of a federal 
law of conflict of state laws the Supreme Court has scarcely yet noticed.”10 
 This Article attempts to answer those questions. Typically, they have been 
addressed as if they were an extension of the conflicts questions that arise in 
diversity jurisdiction. I argue that they are better understood as statutory inter-
pretation questions, though they are still questions that borrow concepts from 
conflicts. From this framework, I argue that Congress can and should provide 
choice-of-law rules when it chooses to rely on state law. I further argue that if it 
does not, the federal courts should indeed “work out a federal answer” through 
a federal common law of conflicts, rather than turning to the law of the forum 
state. (Put in conflicts jargon, the argument is that the Klaxon rule11 does not 
and should not be extended to federal question cases.) A further point is that 
institutional role matters. Congress solves conflicts problems differently than 
courts do because it is free to implement a broad range of policy goals through 
conflicts doctrine, while courts have a more limited role of filling in the gaps 
between Congress’s choices.  
 All of these principles apply to all instances of what I call (following Hart) 
“interstitial law.” Interstitial law is federal law that in turn relies upon concepts 
already created by state law, so called because of Hart’s declaration that much 
of federal law is “interstitial law, assuming the existence of, and depending for 
its impact upon, the underlying bodies of state law.”12 While much of this Arti-
cle focuses on federal statutes that rely upon marriage specifically, DOMA’s 
demise is really just a case study. The framework established here will apply 
more broadly to the many other areas of interstitial law. The DOMA episode 
also provides a case study for the ability of conflicts to provide a stable set of 
rules as a backdrop for broader public law disputes—and the consequences 
when it fails to do so. 
Parts I through III are largely descriptive. Part I introduces DOMA and 
shows that it could be invalidated or repealed while state bans on same-sex 
marriage remain. Part II discusses the different methods state courts have used 
for choosing what law governs a marriage (which I call first-order choice of 
law). Part III discusses the different second-order methods federal courts have 
used for choosing a state’s law. Parts IV through VII are largely normative. 
Part IV argues that the so-called second-order choice-of-law problem is ulti-
mately a problem of statutory interpretation, with the consequence that Con-
 
 9. Hart, supra note 5, at 536. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 12. Hart, supra note 5, at 498. Some have argued that there are important differences 
between “borrowing” or “incorporating” state law, and treating it as “antecedent” to federal 
law. See Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 834-56 
(2011). I borrow Hart’s terminology in part to transcend this debate. 
BAUDE 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2012 12:22 PM 
1376 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1371 
gress may fix it as it likes. Part V examines the role of the courts if Congress 
does not act, and argues that federal courts can and should develop a federal 
common law of conflicts. Part VI argues that different federal institutions 
should solve this problem differently—Congress by recognizing the law of the 
state of celebration, courts by recognizing the law of the couple’s domicile. Part 
VII expands these conclusions to other areas of interstitial law, and discusses 
the role of conflicts doctrine in making public-law federalism work. 
I. DOMA 
A. Section 3 
As many people know from filing their taxes or receiving federal benefits, 
federal law frequently deals with marital status. Married couples can file joint 
tax returns, and pay different tax amounts from unmarried couples.13 Students’ 
federal financial assistance depends on their family’s financial situation.14 Fed-
eral employees can seek health benefits for their families.15 A 2004 report up-
date from the U.S. General Accounting Office tallied 1138 federal statutory 
provisions that turn on marital status.16 Some, perhaps most, of these provi-
sions benefit couples who marry. Others (such as the so-called tax “marriage 
penalty,” or the financial-aid provisions) usually burden them.17 
Federal officials don’t generally issue marriage licenses,18 and there is no 
single overarching provision of the U.S. Code that defines what a marriage is—
except section 3 of DOMA. It provides that: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regula-
tion, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.19 
 
 13. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); id. § 6013(a), (c). 
 14. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1090-1091; Tara Siegel Bernard, For Children of Same-Sex 
Couples, a Student Aid Maze, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at B1. 
 15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8905(a), 8956(a). 
 16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: 
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf 
(updating U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 
(1997)). For explication of these and other examples, see Gill v. Office of Personnel Man-
agement, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379-83 (D. Mass. 2010); and Massachusetts v. United States 
Department of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239-44 (D. Mass. 2010).  
 17. See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for 
the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2000); Bernard, supra note 14. 
 18. To the extent that officers of the District of Columbia and the territories are federal 
officers, see Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 336 (1806), they are of course an ex-
ception. E.g., D.C. CODE § 46-410 (2011). 
 19. 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
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This part of DOMA is codified in Chapter 1 of Title 1 of the U.S. Code, the 
chapter designated for global statutory definitions. Chapter 1 is what provides 
that “words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well”; that 
“‘oath’ includes affirmation”; and that the phrase “‘insane person’ . . . shall in-
clude every idiot, lunatic, . . . and person non compos mentis.”20 DOMA sits 
alongside these more quotidian definitions making a major rule of federal mar-
riage law. It cuts across the entire U.S. Code (and the Code of Federal Regula-
tions and other compilations of administrative law), defining marriage to ex-
clude same-sex marriages even if they would otherwise be recognized under 
state law.21 
B. DOMA’s Possible Demise 
DOMA may not remain enforceable for long. Three district courts have al-
ready concluded that section 3 violates equal protection.22 One of them has 
been affirmed on appeal, with the court noting that “only the Supreme Court 
can finally decide this unique case.”23 A federal bankruptcy court in Califor-
nia—in an order signed by twenty of its judges—has declared DOMA unconsti-
tutional.24 And a federal appellate judge—acting in his capacity as an adminis-
trator of benefits for the federal public defender’s office—has also declared 
section 3 to be unconstitutionally discriminatory.25 With the executive branch 
agreeing that the statute is unconstitutional, it seems reasonable to expect that 
more courts will follow suit. (DOMA has other provisions—pertaining, for ex-
 
 20. 1 U.S.C. § 1; cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodol-
ogy as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1924 n.82 (2011) (noting that § 1 
“covers only the simplest interpretive conventions”); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 97 n.91 (2000) (calling these definitions “largely insignificant”). 
 21. DOMA’s definition is also more emphatic than some of these other statutory defi-
nitions, which apply only “unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C. § 1; accord 
Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199-201 (1993); First Nat’l Bank v. Missouri, 
263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924). DOMA contains no such caveat. See 1 U.S.C. § 7.  
 22. Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 10-01564, 2012 WL 1909603 (N.D. 
Cal. May 24, 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974, 1002-
03 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 
2010) (Tauro, J.). Technically DOMA has been held to violate the “equal protection compo-
nent” of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 
1002, because the Equal Protection Clause itself is inapplicable to the federal government. 
 23. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2207, slip op. at 11 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012). 
 24. In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); cf. Susan E. Hauser, More than 
Abstract Justice: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Equal Treatment of Same-Sex Mar-
ried Couples Under Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 197-98 
(2011) (defending Balas). 
 25. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th 
Cir. 2009). The enforceability of such orders was at issue in Golinski v. United States Office 
of Personnel Management, 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011), though that issue might 
ultimately be rendered academic by the same judge’s conclusion that DOMA is indeed un-
constitutional, see Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-03. 
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ample, to interstate recognition of marriage—that have also been constitutional-
ly controversial. But the administration has only abandoned section 3.26) 
The invalidation of DOMA would not necessarily lead to the invalidation 
of state laws that forbid same-sex marriage, however. Suppose that courts ac-
cept the administration’s contention that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation should be subject to “a heightened standard of scrutiny.”27 A court 
might distinguish between state marriage statutes and DOMA in two ways. One 
way is reliance on tradition: a court might conclude that longstanding tradition 
at the state level justifies the preservation of the separate institution of mar-
riage, but that DOMA does not reflect a similar tradition, because prior to 
DOMA the federal government largely relied on state definitions of marriage. 
The other possibility is legislative history. Under heightened scrutiny, a court 
must look at the legislature’s “actual justifications for the law,” not merely 
“hypothetical rationales, independent of the legislative record.”28 This means 
that the constitutionality of a law depends on why it was enacted. The actual 
justifications given for DOMA’s restrictions on same-sex marriage might differ 
from those proffered historically in many states.29  
Courts may also distinguish DOMA and state statutes under rational-basis 
scrutiny. Courts that have invalidated DOMA for its lack of a rational basis30 
have distinguished it from state marriage laws. For example, Judge Tauro, of 
the District of Massachusetts, found DOMA to violate principles of equal pro-
tection, asserting that “‘there exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could 
ground a rational relationship’ between DOMA and a legitimate government 
objective.”31 The court bolstered that conclusion with its assertion that “the 
subject of domestic relations is the exclusive province of the states” and that 
when state marriage laws have “varied from state to state throughout the course 
of history,” the federal government has traditionally “recogniz[ed] as valid for 
federal purposes any heterosexual marriage which has been declared valid pur-
suant to state law.”32 By contrast, it might be possible to uphold state marriage 
laws in light of their long history. Even scholars who are skeptical of the role of 
 
 26. For simplicity’s sake, I will frequently use “DOMA” when I mean to refer specifi-
cally to section 3. 
 27. DOMA Letter, supra note 1; see also Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Motions 
to Dismiss at 18, Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (No. 10-257) [hereinafter U.S. Golinski 
Brief]. 
 28. DOMA Letter, supra note 1 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 
535-36 (1996)); see U.S. Golinski Brief, supra note 27, at 18-20. 
 29. See DOMA Letter, supra note 1 (discussing DOMA’s legislative record). 
 30. E.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010); see 
also In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 574 n.5 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that the justifi-
cations actually offered for DOMA would “fail[] even the lowest standard of constitutional 
scrutiny (rational basis)”). 
 31. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (footnote omitted) (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 
F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
 32. Id. at 391. The court did not discuss the second-order conflicts problem. 
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tradition in justifying discriminatory statutes concede that the tradition-based 
justification for state marriage laws is “sufficiently plausible to satisfy at least 
the most deferential standard of rational basis review.”33 State marriage laws 
have such a tradition. DOMA may not.34 
The First Circuit’s decision in Gill—the first Court of Appeals decision on 
the constitutionality of DOMA—is illustrative. The court declined the admin-
istration’s invitation to apply heightened scrutiny, but also applied something 
greater than rational basis review.35 It found the equal protection challenge to 
DOMA “uniquely reinforced by federalism concerns.”36 It thus held DOMA 
unconstitutional, even after concluding that it was limited to rationales “that do 
not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”37 
In other words, there is a federalism angle to the legal attacks on 
DOMA. Federal law borrows state marriage law for nearly every question of 
marital validity except the validity of same-sex marriages.38 Just as in Romer v. 
Evans,39 the decision to single out that one issue for different structural treat-
ment might be found unconstitutional. Indeed, many of DOMA’s critics have 
articulated the attack in federalist terms.40 The plaintiffs’ appellate brief in Gill 
 
 33. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Mar-
riage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 309 (2011). 
 34. For a defense of DOMA against arguments based on tradition and federalism, see 
Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and 
the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, 973-85 (2010). 
 35. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2207, slip op. at 13-15 (1st Cir. May 31, 
2012). 
 36. Id. at 19-23. 
 37. Id. at 12. 
 38. See David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 
19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 805, 824 (2011) (“Section 3 leaves in place state marriage def-
initions for federal purposes regardless of how young or old a putative spouse is. It leaves in 
place state marriage definitions regardless of what diseases or genetic conditions a person 
might have. It leaves in place state marriage definitions regardless of how closely related the 
two spouses might be. But if a state marriage definition embraces a same-sex couple, section 
3 means that the federal government will suddenly and across-the-board refuse to use the 
state definition.”). But see Wardle, supra note 34, at 973-82 (arguing that federal law has 
frequently provided its own definition of marriage). DOMA also denies federal recognition 
to a marriage of more than two persons, which no state currently authorizes; it has no effect, 
however, on bigamy (one person with multiple two-person marriages). 
 39. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 40. See Cruz, supra note 38, at 815-23; Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Consti-
tutional and Legal Defects in the “Defense of Marriage” Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221, 
231-39 (1996); see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. 
Supp. 2d 234, 249 (D. Mass. 2010) (Tauro, J.) (invalidating DOMA under the Tenth 
Amendment); 142 CONG. REC. H7481 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mink); 
Mark Strasser, DOMA’s Bankruptcy 30 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/mark_strasser/22 (noting arguments against DOMA that “would 
leave state same-sex marriage bans unscathed,” as well as other arguments against DOMA 
that “would seem equally applicable to state same-sex marriage bans”); cf. The West Wing: 
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repeatedly emphasized that “a state’s decision to exclude same-sex couples 
from marrying . . . is not the issue. The issue is whether Congress was constitu-
tionally justified in refusing to treat already married same-sex couples as mar-
ried . . . .”41 Even DOMA’s author has argued that it should be repealed be-
cause it “is simply incompatible” with “federalism and the primacy of state 
government over the federal.”42 There is a real possibility that courts will strike 
down DOMA without striking down all state statutes that forbid same-sex   
marriages. 
There is another way that DOMA might fall while state marriage laws do 
not: congressional action. Congress might well repeal DOMA before the courts 
definitively opine on its constitutionality, just as it recently repealed the statute 
banning the openly gay from serving in the military.43 Some courts had coun-
tenanced constitutional challenges to the ban on gay service members, and that 
may have catalyzed repeal efforts.44 One could imagine a similar path for 
DOMA, and there have been proposals to repeal it,45 though the political reality 
is that the courts will likely be consigned to deal with DOMA on their own for 
a while longer.  
Any of these scenarios will pose the choice-of-law problem discussed in 
this Article—that is, how federal law decides whether a same-sex couple is 
married. All of these scenarios are also consistent with the legal theory articu-
lated by the Attorney General. Holder’s letter went out of its way to note that 
while section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional, state laws that limit marriage to 
opposite-sex couples are not necessarily similarly invalid. The letter refers 
three times to those “legally” wed “under state law,”46 thus presupposing that 
there could be state laws that made same-sex marriages illegal. Similarly, the 
administration’s first federal court brief attacking DOMA’s constitutionality 
complained that the statute “distinguish[ed] among couples who are already le-
gally married in their own states”47 and relied substantially on DOMA’s failure 
 
The Supremes (NBC television broadcast Mar. 24, 2004) (showing fictional conservative 
jurist criticizing DOMA on federalism grounds). 
 41. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nancy Gill, et al. and Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Dean Hara at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-
2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Gill Brief]; see also id. at 55-59 (emphasizing this 
point). 
 42. See Bob Barr, Wedding Blues, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13. 
 43. See Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515. 
 44. See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA & DAN WOODS, UNDERSTANDING THE REPEAL OF DON’T 
ASK DON’T TELL: AN IMMEDIATE LOOK AT POLICY CHANGES ALLOWING GAYS AND LESBIANS 
TO OPENLY SERVE IN THE MILITARY 6-7, 15 (2011) (attributing momentum to Log Cabin Re-
publicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010)). 
 45. See sources cited infra note 177.  
 46. DOMA Letter, supra note 1. 
 47. U.S. Golinski Brief, supra note 27, at 4 n.3.  
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to recognize valid state law marriages.48 The administration may eventually ar-
gue that state same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional, but it has not done 
so yet. Indeed, in his heralded remarks on same-sex marriage, President Obama 
explained that while he “personally . . . think[s] same-sex couples should be 
able to get married,” he thought it was “a mistake to try to make what has tradi-
tionally been a state issue into a national issue.”49  
In discussing these scenarios of DOMA’s demise, I mean to put to one side 
the core controversy over whether there is a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage.50 That controversy is surely important, but its importance has 
eclipsed the other legal issues tied up with DOMA’s likely destruction. Under-
standing the choice-of-law problems that lie beyond DOMA should be im-
portant to both sides. And, of course, it is quite possible that courts will ulti-
mately uphold DOMA,51 or invalidate it on more far-reaching grounds, and 
will eventually hold that states must recognize same-sex marriage.52 
Whatever the ultimate fate of constitutional claims to same-sex marriage, 
there will be a critical period of time when this choice-of-law problem exists, 
possibly a long one.53 Courts are striking down DOMA now, but those same 
courts are not simultaneously holding that all states must recognize same-sex 
marriages. The conflicts problem may also have relevance for the current litiga-
tion over DOMA: For one thing, if a couple is not validly married under the 
relevant state law, they may not have standing to challenge DOMA in the first 
place.54 For another, the appellate briefs in Gill invoked conflicting visions of 
how, absent DOMA, federal law will ascertain when same-sex couples are mar-
ried.55 Even beyond same-sex marriage, there are important implications for 
 
 48. Id. at 20-22. 
 49. See Interview by Robin Roberts with Barack Obama (May 9, 2012) (transcript 
available at abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-president-
obama/story?id=16316043). 
 50. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 933 (1998). See also ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE 
LINES, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES]. 
 51. See, e.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 879-80 (C.D. Cal. 2005), 
vacated for lack of standing, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 
1298, 1301, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
2004). 
 52. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d on 
narrower grounds, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 53. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Race, Religion, Gender, and Interstate Federalism: Some 
Notes from History, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 19, 26 n.20 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Introduc-
tion: Same-Sex Marriage as a Moving Story, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2005). 
 54. See Smelt, 447 F.3d at 683-84; Strasser, supra note 40, at 7. 
 55. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. 
House of Representatives at 46-47, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 
10-2214 (1st Cir. Sept. 22, 2011) [hereinafter House Brief]; Gill Brief, supra note 41, at 43; 
see infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.  
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other, similar federal choice-of-law problems. As this Article will discuss, fed-
eral courts have disagreed for decades on how to apply federal law that incor-
porates state law rules. That problem predates DOMA and will outlast it, and 
solving it is important in its own right. 
II. FIRST-ORDER CONFLICTS: MARRIAGE AND STATE CHOICE OF LAW 
It may have seemed simple enough to say that the federal government 
would rely on same-sex “marriages . . . legally recognized under state law.”56 
But which state’s law governs is surprisingly complicated. As Justice Scalia has 
put it, “the diversity among the States in choice-of-law principles has become 
kaleidoscopic,”57 and that is particularly true of marriage.  
This Part briefly sketches the disagreements among states on the choice-of-
law rules affecting marriage, especially same-sex marriage. Subparts A and B 
describe the common conflicts between the place where the marriage was 
“celebrated” and the place where the couple lives or will live. Subpart C then 
sketches the existing doctrines—the First Restatement, the Second 
Restatement, interest analysis, etc.—for resolving these first-order conflicts. 
Finally, Subpart D shows why the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which might 
seem to resolve these conflicts, does not do so. The point of this Part is not to 
exhaustively catalog the state conflicts over recognizing foreign same-sex 
marriages, but to convey the breadth of the disarray, which feeds into the 
second-order conflicts problem discussed afterwards.58 
A. Celebration v. Domicile 
Consider this example: A same-sex couple travels to state A, which happily 
marries them. (In conflicts parlance, state A is called “the state of celebration.”) 
But the couple does not live there. They came from their permanent home in 
state B, which does not allow same-sex couples to marry. (In conflicts parlance, 
state B is often called “the state of domicile.”) The couple returns home. Are 
 
 56. DOMA Letter, supra note 1.  
 57. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58. This Article does not delve into how states determine who is a man and who is a 
woman, or when they recognize gender determinations made by other states. Those compli-
cated issues deserve thorough treatments of their own. See, e.g., Julie A. Greenberg, When is 
a Same-Sex Marriage Legal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination, 38 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 289, 295-307 (2004); Shana Brown, Note, Sex Changes and “Opposite-Sex” Mar-
riage: Applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of 
Transgendered Persons’ Amended Legal Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1113, 1128-55 (2001); see also David B. Cruz, Sexual Judgments: Full Faith and Credit and 
the Relational Character of Legal Sex, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51 (2011). It suffices for 
this Article to observe that the disarray over recognizing same-sex marriage is even worse 
for individuals whose sex is in dispute. 
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they married? Is their marriage governed by the law of the state of celebration, 
or the law of their state of domicile? 
As a practical matter, the law of state A, the state of celebration, will usual-
ly be in favor of the marriage. After all, the parties are unlikely to get a mar-
riage license there if the license cannot lawfully issue.59 Recent history pro-
vides occasional exceptions—like the City of San Francisco’s attempt to issue 
same-sex marriage licenses despite the California Supreme Court’s eventual 
conclusion that local officials could not do so60—but these exceptions are rare. 
Usually, state officials won’t break the law to issue licenses. 
What about state B? Its reaction may vary. Until last summer, for example, 
New York did not permit same-sex couples to marry.61 But if a New York cou-
ple traveled to Massachusetts to get married, New York courts recognized the 
marriage, holding that while “[t]he Legislature may decide to prohibit the 
recognition of same-sex marriages solemnized abroad,” it had not done so, and 
“[u]ntil it does . . . such marriages are entitled to recognition in New York.”62 
The decisions followed the spirit of In re May’s Estate, a famous New York 
case that allowed a couple to travel to Rhode Island to evade New York’s con-
sanguinity laws.63 Thus, New York allowed the law of the state of celebration 
to control. 
So too do a handful of other states. Maryland’s Attorney General conclud-
ed that state law likely required it to recognize same-sex marriages from other 
jurisdictions, even when same-sex couples could not get married in Mary-
land.64 Rhode Island’s Attorney General has issued a similar opinion, interpret-
ing state law to recognize foreign same-sex marriages.65 So has New Mexi-
 
 59. Thanks to Lea Brilmayer for this point.  
 60. See Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 495 (Cal. 2004) (declaring 
same-sex marriages licensed by San Francisco “void and of no legal effect from their incep-
tion”); see also Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748, 
1764-65 (2005); Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors 
and Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 5-14 (2007). 
 61. Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 361 (App. Div. 2005), superseded by 
Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (McKinney). 
 62. Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008); see also 
Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009) (avoiding the question); In re Estate of 
Ranftle, 917 N.Y.S.2d 195, 195 (App. Div. 2011) (following Martinez); Lewis v. N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578, 584 (App. Div. 2009) (same). 
 63. In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (N.Y. 1953); see also Gary J. Simson, Be-
yond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 
326-55 (2006) (discussing May’s Estate). 
 64. Marriage—Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That Is Valid in the State of 
Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf. 
 65. See Letter from Patrick Lynch, R.I. Attorney Gen., to Jack R. Warner, Comm’r, 
R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ. (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.glad.org/ 
uploads/docs/cases/cote-whitacre-et-al-v-dept-public-health/ri-ag-statement.pdf.  
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co’s.66 It is not certain that the courts in those states will agree,67 but these 
opinions illustrate the possibility of a state’s recognizing foreign same-sex mar-
riages without authorizing them at home.68 
In contrast to these states, many other states that do not celebrate same-sex 
marriages have also enacted laws that explicitly refuse to recognize such mar-
riages performed elsewhere. Alabama, for example, refuses to “recognize as 
valid any marriage of parties of the same sex . . . regardless of whether a mar-
riage license was issued.”69 Many other states have similar prohibitions.70 If a 
same-sex couple lives in such a state (state B), and travels to a state (state A) 
where same-sex marriage is recognized, and marries there, their domicile will 
not recognize the marriage when they return home. 
The result can be a real conflict. If state A’s law applies, the couple’s mar-
riage is valid, because it complied with all of the basic requirements of the law 
of state A. But if state B’s law applies, the couple’s marriage is invalid, because 
state B’s law refuses to recognize it. It then becomes outcome determinative 
which state’s law applies. And even if one anticipates that state A’s courts will 
apply A’s law and state B’s will apply B’s, it is not clear what a third state is 
supposed to do, let alone a federal court faced with a choice between the two 
states. 
The legislature of state A might decide to try to avoid such conflicts with 
state B preemptively. At the time it decided to recognize same-sex marriage, for 
example, Massachusetts had a statute (dating back to 1916) which provided that 
“[n]o marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing 
and intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage 
would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction.”71 But Massachusetts re-
pealed the statute in 2008.72 Only a handful of states have similar laws, and on-
 
 66. Are Same-Sex Marriages Performed in Other Jurisdictions Valid in New Mexico?, 
Op. N.M. Att’y Gen. No. 11-01 (2011), available at http://97.65.186.35/pdf/4%20Jan%2011 
-Rep.%20Al%20Park-Opinion%2011-01%5B1%5D.pdf. 
 67. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 972-73 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J., dis-
senting).  
 68. See also Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 154 n.1 (Wyo. 2011) (leaving 
foreign-recognition question undecided); Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of 
Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial 
Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 136, 141 (2010) (noting that Wyoming law lacks a “a clear 
statement against the validity of a same-sex marriage celebrated outside the enacting juris-
diction”). 
 69. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (2011). 
 70. A recent article counted thirty-eight such states. Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting 
Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 447 
(2005). Another survey counted forty. KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 8. 
 71. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (2006) (repealed 2008); see also Cote-Whitacre v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 632 (Mass. 2006) (Spina, J., concurring) (quoting 
section 11). 
 72. Act of July 31, 2008, §1, 2008 Mass. Acts 1014. 
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ly one state that issues same-sex marriage licenses does (New Hampshire).73 
There are thus frequent conflicts between one state’s attempt to celebrate a 
marriage and another state’s refusal to recognize it. 
B. Migratory and Visiting Marriages 
Those conflicts have even more severe practical effects—and face a murki-
er legal framework—in the case of so-called migratory marriages. Consider this 
new scenario. This time the same-sex couple lives in state A, which permits 
same-sex marriages. They marry there. But ultimately they decide to move to a 
new state (state B) together, where same-sex marriages are not performed. 
What happens to their marriage? 
As before, there are several states that would recognize such a marriage. 
Maryland, Rhode Island, and New Mexico would likely recognize such a mar-
riage even if the couple had never lived in state A.74 They are even more likely 
to do so if state A had the closest connection to the couple at the time of the 
marriage. But, as discussed above, many states have laws stating that same-sex 
marriages celebrated abroad will not be recognized, period. These laws appear 
to extinguish the couple’s marriage upon their arrival in state B, no matter how 
long it had previously been recognized elsewhere.  
Indeed, some states have interpreted their laws in this fashion. Consider the 
fate of J.B. and H.B., two men whose real lives match our example. They lived 
in Massachusetts and married there in 2006, then relocated to Texas two years 
later.75 Alas, J.B. then sought a divorce from his spouse in Texas divorce court. 
The trial court took jurisdiction over the case, but the state of Texas intervened 
and got a writ of mandamus from the Texas Court of Appeals. The Texas ap-
peals court held that a same-sex couple could not be treated as married in Tex-
as, and hence could not divorce. The court simply observed that the “Texas 
Constitution provides that ‘[m]arriage in this state shall consist only of the un-
ion of one man and one woman,’” and that the “rule contains no exceptions for 
marriages performed in other jurisdictions.”76 Any same-sex marriage must be 
abandoned at the Texas border.77 And yet—though the Texas court did not 
 
 73. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:44 (2011); see also Jeffrey A. Redding, Slicing 
the American Pie: Federalism and Personal Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 941, 995 
(2008) (noting that Vermont, New Hampshire, Illinois, and Wisconsin have similar anti-
evasion statutes); An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil 
Marriage, § 12, 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (LexisNexis) (effective Sept. 1, 2009) (repeal-
ing Vermont’s anti-evasion statute). 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67. 
 75. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010). 
 76. Id. at 669 (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32(a)). 
 77. Perhaps in Louisiana too, according to dicta in Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 
731 (La. Ct. App. 2008), which noted that “the Louisiana Legislature has not expressly out-
lawed marriages between first cousins regardless of where they are contracted, as it has em-
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dwell on this fact—the couple’s marriage almost certainly remained valid back 
in Massachusetts, and the couple “likely . . . continue[d] to accrue rights and 
responsibilities vis-à-vis each other by virtue of their status as spouses.”78 
Thanks to the conflict between Texas and Massachusetts, J.B. and H.B. had 
two marital statuses simultaneously.79 
It is not yet clear whether all states will interpret their anti-recognition laws 
that broadly. Andrew Koppelman, for example, argues that they should not. 
Drawing upon the history of similarly worded statutes (from interracial mar-
riage cases), Koppelman argues that most of these statutes should be construed 
to apply only to “evasion cases”—i.e., to couples who were already residents of 
the state but traveled elsewhere to be married—not to “void” the marriages of 
couples who visit or move to the state.80  
Koppelman is surely correct that invalidating preexisting marriages is 
strong medicine. Others have called it inconsistent with “relevant polices [sic] 
of . . . [the] states, the protection of justified expectations, and certainty and 
predictability,”81 and even argued that it is unconstitutional.82 If those consid-
erations cause some states to interpret their anti-recognition statutes more nar-
rowly, that is yet another way in which state treatment of interstate marriages 
will vary.  
Finally, consider the visiting marriage. Our same-sex couple once again 
lives in state A, and marries there. State A remains their permanent domicile. 
But one or both members of the couple still travel occasionally throughout the 
country, occasionally interacting with other states’ legal systems. If one spouse 
earns income elsewhere and files a state tax return, that state must decide 
whether he files separately or jointly. Other states might also have to decide 
whether a visiting couple can exercise parental or property rights that their 
home state allows. If one spouse is injured elsewhere, that state must decide if 
the other spouse can make medical decisions; if one spouse is killed elsewhere, 
 
phatically done in the case of purported same-sex marriages.” Id. at 747 n.31 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 78. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and 
Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1683 (2011). 
 79. See id. at 1683-89; see also id. at 1679-83 (noting that couples generally can only 
seek a divorce in the state where one of them lives); Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-
Sex) Divorce, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1926660. 
 80. See KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 137-40. 
 81. Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2205 (2005) (arguing that the applicable law in such circumstances 
should be the law of the state in which the couple was domiciled when they were married). 
 82. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why 
the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws 
Cannot, 110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1903386; accord MARK STRASSER, SAME-SEX UNIONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 193-94 
(2011). 
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that state must decide whether the other spouse can retain custody and bring the 
child home.83 
The state’s more fleeting connection to a visitor’s marriage might provide 
yet another reason for anti-recognition states to read their anti-recognition pro-
visions more narrowly. It is already a burden to tell a couple that they cannot 
relocate to another state without sacrificing their marriage; to tell them that they 
cannot visit is even more extreme. But, once more, it is not clear that the plain 
texts of the anti-recognition statutes will permit any narrowing interpretation. 
C. Resolving Conflicts of Law 
As the examples demonstrate, a marriage can easily interact with the laws 
of multiple states, and these interactions can give rise to a conflict of state laws. 
Each of those states must decide whether to apply its own law or another’s to 
the controversy. And in many situations a third state can also be called upon to 
adjudicate the conflict, in which case it must figure out how to pick as well. 
There are many different theories for deciding which state’s law to apply. Once 
again, the point is not to catalog them exhaustively, but just to show that there 
is no dominant view of how to mediate among the interests of the celebrating 
state, the domiciliary state, and other states.  
One of the oldest theories of conflicts still in common currency is set forth 
in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, reported in 1934 by Joseph Henry 
Beale.84 Section 121 of the First Restatement says: “Except as stated in §§ 131 
and 132, a marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law 
of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied with.”85 
Section 132 says: “A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil 
of either party, though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration 
have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere” (even in the state of cel-
ebration!) if it is a “marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil 
makes void even though celebrated in another state.”86 Taken together, these 
rules make the law of the state of celebration the default, while giving a broad 
role to the parties’ domicile to overrule the law of the state of celebration. 
Indeed, while section 132 is phrased as an exception to section 121, it is the 
kind of exception that potentially consumes the rule.87 State B has the power to 
invalidate any marriage imported from another state, so long as it passes a 
 
 83. See KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 72-73. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
 85. Id. § 121. 
 86. Id. § 132. Section 132 also provides—less relevantly—that the marriage is void if 
it is a “(a) polygamous marriage, (b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related 
that their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil, (c) marriage between 
persons of different races where such marriages are at the domicil regarded as odious.” Id. 
 87. See generally Perry Dane, Whereof One Cannot Speak: Legal Diversity and the 
Limits of a Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 511, 512-14 (2000). 
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“statute” which “makes [such marriages] void even though celebrated in anoth-
er state.”88 State A’s authorization to marry controls only if state B lets it. Thus, 
the Restatement declares, “[t]he rule stated in [section 132] recognizes the par-
amount interest of the domiciliary state in the marital status.”89 In conflicts be-
tween state B and state A, B should win.  
The Second Restatement—reported in 1971 and intended to provide a more 
flexible, less formalistic approach to conflicts—describes a different approach. 
It states in section 283(1): “The validity of a marriage will be determined by the 
local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles 
stated in § 6.”90 
That section 6, in turn, describes the Second Restatement’s overarching 
approach to choice of law. It instructs each court to “follow a statutory directive 
of its own state on choice of law,” if there is one.91 If not, states are to take into 
account seven incommensurate factors ranging from the “relevant policies” of 
the forum state and “other interested states” to the “justified expectations” of 
the parties, “ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied,” 
and “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.”92 A comment empha-
sizes: “Protection of the justified expectations of the parties is a basic policy 
underlying the field of marriage.”93 
On top of that test, the Second Restatement adds in section 283(2): “A mar-
riage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was con-
tracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong pub-
lic policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the 
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”94 This part of the Second 
Restatement produces several puzzles, including the relationship between sec-
 
 88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132. 
 89. Id. § 132 cmt. a; see also Joseph H. Beale et al., Marriage and the Domicil, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 529 (1931) (“[T]he decisions . . . show one underlying principle: control 
over the marital status rests with the domicil.”). The Restatement is arguably ambiguous 
about which domiciles have such veto power. Some scholars have suggested that only the 
domicile “at the time of the marriage” has the power to veto marriages that it views as ab-
horrent. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing 
to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 344 (1998). Others have under-
stood the First Restatement more broadly. See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, 
“Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 994-95 & n.90 (1956); ac-
cord State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971). 
 91. Id. § 6(1). 
 92. Id. § 6(2). 
 93. Id. § 283 cmt. b. 
 94. Id. § 283(2). Some have suggested that the domicile will have the most significant 
relationship “in most cases.” Grossman, supra note 70, at 474. Others think the test lets the 
court pick any “one of the following potential candidates: (1) the domicile of either party at 
the time of the marriage, (2) the state of celebration, and (3) the state where the couple plans 
to live after the marriage.” Strasser, supra note 89, at 352. 
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tions 283(1) and 283(2). What if the state with the “most significant relation-
ship” under section 283(1) is different from “the state where the marriage was 
contracted” or the “state which had the most significant relationship . . . at the 
time of the marriage”?95 Even if it were entirely clear what it meant, the Se-
cond Restatement’s approach has not brought much clarity to conflicts either. 
There are plenty of states that do not purport to follow it,96 and even among 
those states that do purport to follow the Second Restatement generally, there is 
little consistent adherence to the specifics.97  
Another approach is so-called “interest analysis,” an academic theory 
which has found some favor in the courts. Like the Second Restatement, it re-
jects the formalism of the First Restatement in the service of finding the states 
who have an “interest” in regulating any particular situation. It is not entirely 
clear how interest analysis would resolve interstate disputes over marital status. 
Some commentators have suggested that it would generally favor the law of the 
state of celebration, while allowing a subsequent domicile to veto the marriage 
if it spoke clearly.98 Others have suggested that interest analysis limits the 
choice of law to states whose interest existed at the time of the marriage—
namely, “the domicile(s) of the parties, the state where the marriage takes 
place, and the place where the couple plans to live at the time of the            
marriage.”99 
Scholars have suggested other approaches too, such as Andrew 
Koppelman’s application of Doug Laycock’s suggestion that “a clean solution 
to the question of a marriage’s existence would be to rely, in all cases, on the 
law of the parties’ domicile.”100 Domiciles would never recognize foreign mar-
riages that were forbidden at home, and they would invalidate such marriages if 
the couple moved there later. This is not a solution that many states have 
adopted—and again, the point is that state choice of law is in chaos, not that 
any one solution is good or bad. 
 
 95. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1), with id. 
§ 283(2). 
 96. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: 
Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 231-32 (2010). 
 97. Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observa-
tions and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (1997); see also id. (“The result, 
which will surprise no one who has closely followed American conflicts doctrine, is that ci-
tation to the Second Restatement is often little more than a veil hiding judicial intuition.”); 
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foun-
dations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992) (“Trying to be all things to all 
people, [the Second Restatement] produced mush.”). 
 98. See Grossman, supra note 70, at 475; see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest 
Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2243-44 (2005) 
(suggesting that courts demand a clear legislative statement before assuming that a state in-
tended to extinguish marriage of a couple that migrates to the state). 
 99. Strasser, supra note 89, at 375-76.  
100. KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 89 (discussing Laycock, supra 
note 97, at 323). 
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Finally, it is worth clarifying that there is also a relatively novel body of 
doctrine related to the so-called “effects” or “incidents” of marriage. As Larry 
Kramer has summarized it: “There was a time when courts treated marriage as 
a simple yes-or-no, up-or-down proposition: A marriage was either valid, in 
which case it was valid for all purposes, or it was not, in which case it was in-
valid for all purposes.”101 But some more modern decisions in some states have 
“been willing to draw finer lines,” applying one rule “to the question of validi-
ty” and a different rule “for particular ‘incidents’ of being married.”102 Thus, a 
court that disapproved of a foreign marriage might hold that a couple’s mar-
riage was valid in the abstract, but that they still were not allowed to adopt a 
child, cohabit together, or receive government-granted spousal benefits in the 
state.103 Or contrariwise, a court might generally refuse to recognize a marriage 
but still grant access to a particular incident of marriage, like the right to       
divorce.104  
Many academics have encouraged this approach,105 but for now only a lit-
tle need be said about it. For purposes of federal choice of law, state status is 
what counts. To the extent they borrow from state law, the federal statutes ask 
who is married, not whether the couple happens to get one or another benefit 
under state law. If the inquiry into state status is abandoned, federal courts must 
either find some way to borrow from state incidents instead (which is difficult, 
because there will not always be an analogy between the state and federal “in-
cident”), or else reject the use of state law altogether.106 This approach of dis-
aggregating marriage into its incidents thus brings little clarity to the federal 
marital choice-of-law problem.  
D. Full Faith and Credit 
Resolving the conflict between different states’ marriage and marital 
recognition laws is the kind of federalism problem that one might reasonably 
 
101. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional 
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997). 
102. Id. 
103. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage 
Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 591, 599. 
104. See, e.g., Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A Critical 
Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce Is an Incident of Marriage That Should 
Be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 252-53 
(2010). 
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 284 cmt. c (1971); Johnson, 
supra note 104, at 252-53; Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 952, 956-57, 965-66 (1977) (written by the reporter of the Second Re-
statement); see also KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 91-96; LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN & ERIN A. O’HARA, THE LAW MARKET 164-66 (2009); Buckley & Ribstein, supra 
note 103, at 597-99. 
106. On the latter, see Part III.C below. 
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expect to be solved by federal law. State recognition policies can have major 
consequences for other states, but no single state is in a position to create a sen-
sible set of rules governing interstate recognition. And, indeed, federal law does 
provide some guidelines, but not enough to eliminate the chaos. 
The Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. 
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such 
Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”107 The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause has sometimes been cited by those who urge that 
states have a duty to recognize marriages from other states.108 But that clause 
has generally not been interpreted to extend as broadly to legislative rulings 
(like those concerning which marriages are valid) as it does to judicial judg-
ments (like specific custody orders that might be premised on those marriag-
es).109 Moreover, even if one thinks that marriages are entitled to full faith and 
credit as “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings,”110 the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause empowers Congress to decide what “effect” those acts, records, 
and proceedings shall have,111 and Congress has explicitly provided (in a sepa-
rate section—section 2—of DOMA) that states are not required to recognize 
same-sex marriages from other states.112 
On top of that, states have traditionally invoked a “public policy” exception 
to resist implementing foreign laws that their legislatures find particularly ob-
jectionable.113 The many state statutes that deny recognition to foreign same-
sex marriages are intended in part as a legislative expression of such policy. 
 
107. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
108. See, e.g., Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of 
Marriage and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 247, 271 (1994); Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages 
Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on 
States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Follow-
ing Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 584-91 (1994); Mark 
Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitu-
tion, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 281-83 (1997); Wolfson & Melcher, supra note 40, at 221-26. 
109. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (“Our precedent differ-
entiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments.”); 
see also David P. Currie, Full Faith & Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 7, 8-9 (1997); 
cf. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (applying full faith 
and credit to a custody judgment related to a same-sex marriage). 
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
111. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1201, 1206 (2009) (“[T]he only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in na-
ture: it obliged states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not mandate the sub-
stantive effect those records should have. The real significance of the Clause was the power 
it granted to Congress to specify that effect later.” (footnote omitted)). 
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
113. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. 
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Section 2 of DOMA114 is expressly intended to ratify such policies (if any rati-
fication were needed). 
Thus, the federal rules of interstate full faith and credit do not provide 
much constraint on the issue of same-sex marriage. They leave that largely to 
conflicting state laws. To be sure, there are scholars who decry this state of af-
fairs, suggesting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause must be interpreted more 
robustly and that invocations of contrary “public policy” by Congress and the 
states are unconstitutional.115 But that is not the only view,116 and it is not yet 
the law. And to constitutionally eliminate the major interstate conflicts, courts 
would have to simultaneously hold: (1) that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
requires interstate recognition of marriages of its own force, (2) that Congress 
cannot (pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause) alter that recognition rule, 
and (3) that this rule cannot be affected by the public policy exception that 
states have long exercised. Whatever the merit of those contentions, they are far 
from current doctrine.117 The Full Faith and Credit Clause has not made this 
problem go away. 
III. SECOND-ORDER CONFLICTS: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS 
As we have seen, state laws differ as to which marriages may be celebrat-
ed, and state laws further differ on the choice-of-law question of which of the 
various states’ laws governs the recognition of a given marriage. I have called 
this state choice-of-law question the “first-order” question. Difference of opin-
ion on this first-order question would not matter to federal courts if they had a 
consistent method of dealing with it—either by choosing some state’s first-
order method or by imposing a method of their own. When a federal court is 
required to apply state law, its method for dealing with this problem—different 
state laws and different “first-order” state choice-of-law rules—is the “second-
order” question.  
Federal courts have established a second-order conflicts rule for diversity 
cases, but they do not have one in federal question cases. This Part discusses 
what they have done so far to muddle through. Subpart A shows how federal 
courts have tried to avoid the choice-of-law question. Subpart B describes the 
 
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
115. E.g., Kramer, supra note 101, at 2003. 
116. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for 
Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 
167-72 (1998); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex “Marriage” and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 56-59 (1998); Sachs, supra note 111, at 1206-08; Ralph U. Whitten, 
The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Mar-
riage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 261 (1998). 
117. One scholar also argues that the Due Process Clause requires states to recognize 
many marriages performed elsewhere. See Sanders, supra note 82, at 5. As with the full faith 
and credit arguments, it suffices for present purposes to note that this theory has not yet 
caught on, and chaos therefore still prevails among the states. 
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Klaxon approach of adopting the forum state’s choice-of-law rules. Subpart C 
describes the federal common law of conflicts, whereby courts create their own 
rules for choosing state law. Subpart D discusses the courts that have aban-
doned state law altogether. 
A. Avoiding the Problem 
Federal courts have confronted marital choice-of-law issues before—long 
before same-sex marriage was legally recognized. Their decisions are instruc-
tive, but they do not provide a decisive answer to the choice-of-law problem. In 
practice, it frequently proved unnecessary for a federal court to actually choose 
a state’s law because the relevant states’ marriage laws were not that different 
on the issue in question, and therefore all would end up treating the marriage 
the same way—or at least the federal court could convince itself of this. The 
issue simply escaped definitive resolution. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tatum v. Tatum,118 issued more than fifty 
years ago, provides an example. A postal clerk and veteran named Erwin Ta-
tum died, leaving his widow entitled to the proceeds of his federal life insur-
ance policy.119 The question for the court was who was his widow. Erwin had 
married two women—first Mattie, the mother of his four children, and later 
Bertha.120 But he did not divorce Mattie until years after he and Bertha cele-
brated their marriage.121 So the fate of Erwin’s $4000 life insurance policy 
turned on questions of bigamy, separation, common law marriage, and choice 
of law. 
The court summarized (and dodged) the choice-of-law dilemma as follows:  
 The parties have assumed without discussion that the question of appel-
lant’s marital status is to be determined by the law of California. The answer is 
not that crystal clear. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Conceivably, this court could refer to the law of either Arizona, Texas, 
or California to determine this question. However, an analysis of the authori-
ties in each state leads us to conclude that regardless of which law is applied, 
appellant cannot prevail. Thus, it is unnecessary to decide whether one of the 
aforementioned alternatives is the exclusive governing law, or whether a 
choice exists, and if so, how the selection is to be made.122 
 
118. 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957). 
119. Id. at 403-04. 
120. Id. at 404. 
121. He also apparently “resumed marital relations” with Mattie for a five-month period 
during his marriage with Bertha. Id. 
122. Id. at 405. 
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Despite recognizing the need for clarity on the choice-of-law issue, the court 
escaped the case without deciding anything about it.123 Alas, that is emblematic 
of other cases from the era.124  
Other federal courts managed to avoid selecting a choice-of-law doctrine 
by deciding that the choice was so obvious that no real choice-of-law theory 
was necessary. It is not that every state had the same substantive law, it is just 
that every plausible theory of conflicts would end up picking the same state. 
For example, in De Sylva v. Ballentine the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
whether illegitimate children counted as “children” under the Copyright Act.125 
The Court aptly noted that “there is no federal law of domestic relations, which 
is primarily a matter of state concern,” and it concluded that state law ap-
plied.126 Thus, the Court explained, “[t]his raises [the] question[] . . . to what 
State do we look[?] . . . The answer to the . . . question, in this case, is not diffi-
cult, since it appears from the record that the only State concerned is California, 
and both parties have argued the case on that assumption.”127 The Court did not 
even discuss the debate over what theory of conflicts to use. It just skipped to 
what it thought was the obvious answer.128  
But such avoidance was not always possible, and surely it will not always 
be possible in the future. In some cases, two states will both have connections 
to the disputed relationship but have markedly different laws about that rela-
tionship. At that point, precedent will no longer provide a sure guide. Federal 
courts that did resolve the marital choice-of-law issue followed different ap-
proaches, as the next three Subparts show. 
B. Klaxon: State Law, State Choice of Law 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins129 ended the rule of Swift v. Tyson130 and 
provided that state law and state judicial doctrine—not federal courts’ exposi-
 
123. What happened to Bertha? The court concluded that her putative marriage to Er-
win was invalid because he was still married to Mattie at the time, and that Bertha had not 
satisfied the requirements for common law marriage after Erwin and Mattie divorced. It add-
ed, with obvious disapproval: “Despite her knowledge of the overlapping marriages, appel-
lant did nothing to rectify the situation, although she did remark to Mattie on one occasion 
that she was going to have Erwin sent to prison for bigamy.” Id. at 411. 
124. See, e.g., Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248, 1249-51 (9th Cir. 1974) (declining to 
decide between California and Nevada); Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O’Leary, 328 
F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (declining to decide between Idaho and Oregon). But see Huff 
v. Dir., Office of Pers. Mgmt., 40 F.3d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding it unnecessary to de-
cide between Pennsylvania and Texas, but concluding that Pennsylvania law would apply). 
125. 351 U.S. 570 (1956). 
126. Id. at 580. 
127. Id. at 581. 
128. The (ultimately victorious) respondent had argued that California law controlled 
because it was the domicile. Brief for Respondent at 41, De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 
570 (1956) (No. 529), 1956 WL 89071. The Court did not mention this analysis. 
129. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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tion of the general common law—govern in federal diversity cases. Klaxon131 
is the choice-of-law sequel to Erie, holding that “in diversity cases the federal 
courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they 
sit.”132 
The question in Klaxon was whether to apply a New York interest statute 
to a diversity case filed in federal court in Delaware. The Third Circuit applied 
the New York statute “apparently . . . from the court’s independent determina-
tion of the ‘better view’ without regard to Delaware law.”133 The Supreme 
Court reversed, explaining: 
 We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 
against such independent determinations by the federal courts, extends to the 
field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal 
court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. 
Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb 
equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting 
side by side. Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity 
within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based.134 
Klaxon explicitly applies only “in diversity cases.”135 The federal marriage 
issues DOMA is concerned with are federal questions. It is not clear whether 
Klaxon should apply to such cases, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly de-
clined to decide whether or not it does.136 Some lower courts have applied 
Klaxon to federal question cases, concluding that “[t]he ability of the federal 
courts to create federal common law and displace state created rules is severely 
limited,” and that federal common law is therefore inappropriate.137 Others 
have applied Klaxon to at least particular areas of federal jurisdiction, such as 
bankruptcy, concluding that it “will enhance predictability in an area where 
 
130. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
131. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
132. Id. at 494. 
133. Id. at 495-96 (discussing Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 
F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1940)). 
134. Id. at 496 (footnote and citations omitted). 
135. Id. at 494. 
136. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (“[W]e need not pause to con-
sider the question whether the conflict-of-laws rule applied in suits where federal jurisdiction 
rests upon diversity of citizenship shall be extended to a case such as this, in which jurisdic-
tion is based upon a federal statute.”); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 
(1942) (“Whether the rule of the Klaxon case applies where federal jurisdiction is not based 
on diversity of citizenship, we need not decide.”); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 
487 U.S. 22, 26 n.3 (1988); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966); 
McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 371 n.2 (1945). 
137. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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predictability is critical.”138 Whether Klaxon should be so extended is one of 
the central unanswered questions of second-order choice of law. 
C. The Federal Common Law of Conflicts: State Law, Federal Choice of 
Law 
There are alternatives to Klaxon. Even if a court still wants to apply state 
law, it could choose state law in a different way—not by incorporating a partic-
ular state’s choice-of-law rules, but by applying some federal choice-of-law 
rule to choose among the states. Because no such federal rule has been codified 
by Congress, it would have to be generated as a matter of federal common law. 
A number of federal courts have done just that. For example, a few years 
after Tatum v. Tatum sidestepped the choice-of-law rules governing the Federal 
Employee Group Life Insurance Act, the Fourth Circuit faced a similar problem 
under the same statute.139 Ernest Brinson married a woman named Clara in 
North Carolina, moved with her to Virginia, divorced her there “a mensa et 
thoro,” and left for North Carolina.140 (Clara remarried and stayed in Virginia.) 
When Ernest died, Clara argued that their putative divorce was merely a legal 
separation (thus invalidating her putative remarriage too) and that she was still 
Ernest’s widow. The Fourth Circuit noted that it was “faced at the onset with a 
choice of law problem,” and recounted the Ninth Circuit’s non-solution in Ta-
tum.141 But unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth had previously created a feder-
al rule—“that the law of an insured’s domicile at the time of his death governs” 
the validity of the marriage.142 (That meant North Carolina, and it meant that 
Clara lost.)143 
A much more recent case from the Sixth Circuit also applied federal com-
mon law.144 That drama centered around Douglas Durden, who married a 
woman named Ann Linzy in Ohio and lived with her from 1966 to 1982, until 
his abusiveness drove her to leave him and move to Tennessee. Six years into 
his marriage with Ann, Douglas had also begun a relationship with another 
woman, Rita Marshall, fathering a child with her and ultimately marrying her in 
 
138. In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1988); see also A.I. Trade 
Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (federal jurisdiction 
under the Edge Act); Cross, supra note 6, at 543-45 (cataloging reliance on Klaxon). 
139. See Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964). 
140. Id. at 157. 
141. Id. at 158 (discussing Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957)). 
142. Id. (citing Grove v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1959)).  
143. The Fourth Circuit did not discuss what would have happened under Virginia law. 
Cf. Gloth v. Gloth, 153 S.E. 879, 886 (Va. 1930) (“[W]hen a divorce a mensa et thoro is de-
creed there is no severance of the marriage bond. The marital status is not affected thereby; 
and the parties remain husband and wife, though authorized by the decree to live in separa-
tion.”). 
144. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
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Las Vegas. Douglas swore that he had divorced Ann many years before in Ten-
nessee; Ann swore not, and no court had a record of such a divorce. Douglas 
eventually died, leaving the two women to squabble over his ERISA-governed 
Chrysler pension plan, which belonged to his legal wife.145 
That squabble in turn hinged on choice of law. The pension plan stated that 
Michigan law would apply to such a dispute.146 The district court applied 
Michigan law, and concluded that Rita was the one entitled to inherit Douglas’s 
benefits.147 But things are different in Ohio. “Contrary to the rule adopted in 
Michigan, Ohio places the burden of proof on the second spouse to demonstrate 
that the first marriage was dissolved.”148 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
federal common law (which it found in the Second Restatement) governed the 
dispute, overrode the plan’s choice of law, and demanded the application of 
Ohio’s law instead of Michigan’s. Under Ohio law, Rita could not prove that 
Ann and Douglas had ever divorced, and Ann was therefore entitled to the   
benefits.149  
The common law approach to choice of law is popular among circuits that 
have refused to extend Klaxon,150 and some academics have endorsed it, albeit 
without fully discussing its complexities.151 Yet, as some of the common law 
cases demonstrate, different courts have chosen different common law rules for 
different statutes. Indeed, some have even chosen different common law rules 
for the same statute. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Tatum, under the Nation-
al Service Life Insurance Act alone, “some would view the law of the place of 
marriage as controlling, others would be guided by the law of the domicile of 
the parties, either at the time of the marriage, or when the alleged claim ac-
crues, [and] another court has declined to resolve the matter.”152 So those in-
clined to reject Klaxon in favor of federal common law must still figure out 
what common law rule they favor.153 
 
145. The facts in this paragraph are all recounted in DaimlerChrysler. Id. at 920-21. 
146. Id. at 921. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 926 (citing Indus. Comm’n v. Dell, 135 N.E. 669 (Ohio 1922)). 
149. Id. at 928. My view is that the case was wrongly decided. See infra notes 265-70 
and accompanying text. 
150. See Berger v. AXA Network LLC, 459 F.3d 804, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2006); Med. 
Mut. of Ohio v. DeSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2001); Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 
1168, 1179 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992); Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 
1294 & n.14 (1st Cir. 1988); see also In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (con-
sidering federal common law to be specially appropriate in bankruptcy). 
151. See Chapman, supra note 6, at *8-9; Gardina, supra note 6, at 923. 
152. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1957) (citing Lembcke v. United 
States, 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 
Muir v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Hendrich v. Anderson, 191 F.2d 
242 (10th Cir. 1951)); see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 
1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retire-
ment Act).  
153. See infra Part VI.B. 
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D. Borax: Federal Law, No Conflicts 
There is an alternative to both of these approaches to picking one of the 
state laws of marriage: refusing to incorporate state law at all. Instead, whether 
a couple is treated as married for purposes of a given statute could be treated as 
an independent question of federal law.  
No federal circuit has fully embraced this approach, but there are elements 
of it in several decisions. For example, the courts have developed a partly fed-
eral definition of marriage in the immigration context, which the Ninth Circuit 
case of Adams v. Howerton summarized this way: “Cases . . . indicate that a 
two-step analysis is necessary to determine whether a marriage will be recog-
nized for immigration purposes.”154 The first step is still the marriage’s validity 
“under state law.”155 But even where that is satisfied (as it was assumed to be 
in Howerton),156 courts must decide “whether the state-approved marriage 
qualifies” under federal immigration law.157 Employing this second step, the 
Howerton court rejected an allegedly valid same-sex marriage from Colorado, 
concluding that as a matter of federal definition, “[t]he term ‘marriage’ ordinar-
ily contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman,” even if that mar-
riage is valid under state law.158 To the extent that a federal court skips ahead 
to the second step to invalidate a marriage, it avoids the choice-of-state-law 
problem entirely. 
A stronger version of that approach may be present in the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Estate of Borax v. Commissioner: Herman Borax, a New Yorker, 
divorced his wife ex parte in Chihuahua, Mexico, and then, “to no one’s sur-
prise,” remarried.159 Because of the unfairness to Herman’s first wife, a New 
York court held the divorce invalid,160 but Herman and his new wife continued 
to file joint tax returns (and deduct alimony payments) until the IRS tried to 
stop them.161 On (posthumous162) appeal of that dispute, the Second Circuit 
sided with Herman and his new wife, concluding that the Mexican divorce (and 
hence his new marriage) was valid for federal tax purposes even if New York 
 
154. 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982). 
155. Id. 
156. The couple “obtained a marriage license from the county clerk in Boulder, Colora-
do, and were ‘married’ by a minister.” Id. The Ninth Circuit observed that at the time “Colo-
rado statutory law . . . neither expressly permit[ted] nor prohibit[ed] homosexual marriages” 
and found it “unnecessary” to decide either way. Id. at 1039. 
157. Id. at 1038.  
158. Id. at 1040; see also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Mar-
riage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1672-73 (2007); Titshaw, supra note 7, at 588-600 (sharply 
criticizing Howerton). 
159. Estate of Borax v. Comm’r, 349 F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 1965). 
160. Borax v. Borax, 119 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1953).  
161. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 668-69. 
162. Id. at 669 n.1 (noting Herman’s death during litigation). 
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thought otherwise.163 Significantly, the court did not suggest that Herman’s di-
vorce or remarriage were valid under state law. It couldn’t, since the New York 
courts had already held the divorce invalid and that judgment would likely be 
preclusive in other states as well.164 While the exact basis for the Second Cir-
cuit’s ruling was somewhat hard to tease out, it appeared to rest its decision 
purely on questions of federal tax policy. As the court put it, “The test would 
not be whether the divorce would be declared invalid in every state, but rather 
whether the divorce frustrated the revenue purposes of the tax laws.”165 
To be sure, the Second Circuit might not really have meant that federal 
marriage can be disentangled from state law, or that the purpose of the tax laws 
justified treating a legally invalid divorce as if it were valid. Perhaps the Court 
simply thought that the legality of a divorce should be judged by the law of the 
place of divorce—even if that place was Chihuahua, Mexico. But Borax has 
certainly inspired scholars to vigorously defend the federal-definition view. 
David Currie, for example, has defended its approach at length, arguing: 
What is important . . . is that the question is . . . basically one of tax law, not of 
conflicts. . . . Whether right or wrong, Borax is a healthy decision from the 
point of view of the conflict of laws, for the court recognizes that statutory 
terms such as ‘husband and wife’ do not necessarily require a determination of 
the validity of the foreign divorce.166 
For Currie, the question is whether it is good federal policy for a particular 
couple to file jointly or deduct alimony, not how that couple’s status matches 
up to state law. Similarly, Willis Reese wrote: 
Error is likely to be committed if it is assumed without investigation and with-
out thought that a word bears the same meaning in every statute in which it 
appears. Such words as marriage, widow, surviving spouse, etc., do not consti-
tute exceptions to this rule. They need not inexorably be interpreted to refer to 
a marriage that is valid under the law of a particular State.167 
IV. CHOICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
If same-sex marriage is to be left to the states, as the administration pro-
poses,168 federal courts must know which states’ laws to look to. Perhaps the 
 
163. Id. at 672-73, 675-76. 
164. Id. at 676 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (discussing preclusion); Borax, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 
820. 
165. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 672; see also id. at 676 (“We found it consonant with 
the tax purposes to recognize this divorce, and hence . . . the second marriage . . . .”); David 
P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 26, 74 (1966) (“Borax rejected the Tax Court’s position that only those legally 
married may file joint returns. Judge Marshall thought legality irrelevant to tax policy . . . .”). 
166. Currie, supra note 165, at 75; see also id. at 26 (“The Australians are dead right: 
divorce ought to be a federal question.”). 
167. Reese, supra note 105, at 965. 
168. See supra notes 1-2, 27-29, and accompanying text. 
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administration assumed that the choice-of-law question would be relatively 
straightforward. But as the previous Part has demonstrated, there is no estab-
lished marital choice-of-law rule in the federal courts. The next two Parts at-
tempt to shed light on that problem, and in the process to clarify the framework 
for “interstitial” federal law more generally. 
This Part discusses the legislative nature of the choice-of-law problem. It 
first establishes that what is called a choice-of-law problem in this context is 
ultimately a form of statutory interpretation, and then discusses the important 
consequence that Congress (or coordinated agency action) can solve it. 
A. Choice of Law as Statutory Interpretation 
To understand how to solve the problem created by DOMA’s impending 
doom it helps to understand that it is, at bottom, a problem of federal statutory 
interpretation. Recall that DOMA operates by effectively amending a thousand 
different legal provisions that invoke marital status.169 The federal government 
has no cause to “recognize” marital status—under state law or otherwise—in 
the abstract. It ascertains who is married only to the extent it is required to un-
der another statutory or regulatory rule. Thus, with or without DOMA, inter-
preters must decide: who does this statute refer to when it refers to married 
couples? 
Federal courts “choose” state law as part of an answer to that statutory in-
terpretation question. Aside from DOMA, the U.S. Code contains few clues 
about how to determine when a marriage is valid. By contrast, states have de-
veloped a thick body of law (both statutory and decisional) on the validity of 
marriages. So it is understandable that federal courts turn to state law to lend 
meaning to the federal law (and that the administration invoked state law as the 
backdrop governing same-sex marriage in the absence of DOMA). A choice-
of-law rule is necessary for state law to completely resolve the meaning of the 
federal statute. Otherwise, as we have seen, a federal court will not know which 
state’s law to apply when those laws differ in a relevant respect.  
Thus, what courts have been calling a choice-of-law problem when federal 
law incorporates state law categories is really just a two-part statutory-
interpretation problem: Federal law contains an undefined term whose meaning 
is ordinarily a legal category. To figure out the meaning of that category, one 
must first decide whether state law is relevant, and if it is, which state’s law. 
(This statutory interpretation problem can exist not only in the thousand stat-
utes incorporating state marriage law, but whenever federal law incorporates 
state law.) 
 
169. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the 
U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995) (“RFRA operates as a sweeping ‘super-
statute,’ cutting across all other federal statutes (now and future, unless specifically exempt-
ed) and modifying their reach.”); supra text accompanying note 16. 
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Several things follow from understanding that this so-called choice-of-law 
problem is really a problem of statutory interpretation. One somewhat technical 
point is that state courts are equally bound by the federal choice-of-law rule—it 
travels with the federal statute. So, for example, if parties end up in state court 
litigating an ERISA question that turns on a couple’s marital status, the court 
should not simply look to whether its own state’s law would recognize the cou-
ple’s marriage. It should decide which state’s marriage law to use on the basis 
of federal interpretative principles. States should be following federal methods 
of statutory interpretation when interpreting federal statutes,170 so they should 
follow the federal “choice-of-law” rule in such scenarios because it is simply a 
rule of statutory interpretation. (This is not to say, however, that states must do 
what their federal circuit does—just that they must follow federal law, however 
it is authoritatively derived.) 
Another technical implication is that it is not quite accurate to ask—as oth-
ers have shorthanded it—whether Klaxon’s choice-of-law rule applies in “fed-
eral question” cases.171 A federal question is a basis for federal jurisdiction; 
there can be federal statutory interpretation questions even where there is no 
federal question jurisdiction.172 The proper way to phrase the question is to ask 
whether Klaxon applies when interpreting a federal statute that relies upon state 
law—a scenario that usually, but not always, occurs in suits grounded in federal 
question jurisdiction.  
Finally, perhaps the most important implication is that Congress has total 
authority to solve the so-called choice-of-law problem. It is generally accepted 
that “definition of legislative terms must, as an original matter, be an incident 
of the legislative power,” because Congress’s power to decide what the statute 
says entails the power to do so through the use of definitions.173 It follows that 
Congress can decide which states’ laws are incorporated by its statutes, because 
those rules are simply a form of definition—of defining more precisely what 
Congress meant in referring to the state law term. 
B. A Congressional Choice-of-Law Rule 
I have just argued that congressional resolution of the choice-of-law prob-
lem is possible; it is also desirable. Congress should decide what law governs 
marriage for federal purposes. Such a provision could cut across all of the regu-
latory and statutory definitions and provide a uniform and predictable ap-
proach. For example, Congress might replace DOMA’s definition of marriage 
 
170. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1553-54 (2006); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statuto-
ry Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2108 (2002); see also Gluck, supra note 20, at 
1960-68 (noting, and lamenting, inconsistent treatment of this issue). 
171. See, e.g., Gardina, supra note 6, at 883. 
172. Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-09 (1986). 
173. Rosenkranz, supra note 170, at 2105. 
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with one saying that in determining the meaning of any law or regulation, the 
word “marriage” means a marriage that is recognized as valid in the state where 
the marriage was celebrated, or one that is recognized as valid in a state where 
one of the parties is domiciled. 
Congress has made such determinations on occasion. Veterans’ benefits 
based on marriage, for example, are awarded “according to the law of the place 
where the parties resided at the time of the marriage or the law of the place 
where the parties resided when the right to benefits accrued.”174 Similarly, the 
Social Security Act provides that marital status determinations will be made by 
reference to the law of the parties’ domicile.175 Both of these statutes predate 
(and are partly eclipsed by) DOMA, but might apply again if it is repealed.176 
Congress should go further, providing a single, clear rule to regulate marriage 
wherever it interacts with the federal code. 
To Congress’s credit, some of the more recent proposals to repeal DOMA 
would have provided a choice-of-law rule in its stead. The bills would have 
provided federal recognition for any marriage that was valid in the state where 
it was celebrated (or “in the case of a marriage entered into outside of any 
State,” it would have been valid “if the marriage [was] valid in the place where 
entered into and the marriage could have been entered into in a State”177). 
Thus, these bills endorsed a strong version of the law of the place of celebra-
tion, with a very narrow public policy exception. Only a marriage from abroad 
is subject to the public policy exception, and only if that marriage would be un-
available to residents of every state in the union. 
Of course, those measures have not passed, but whatever one thinks of the 
substance of the proposed choice-of-law rules, Congress is the best institution 
to provide them. Congressional action provides a clear, stable, ex ante rule for 
determining a couple’s marital status—whether on a statute-by-statute basis or 
across all statutes at once.178 It can solve the marital choice-of-law problem for 
 
174. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). The statute does not say what to do when those two 
states conflict. 
175. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i). 
176. According to 1 U.S.C. § 108, “Whenever an Act is repealed, which repealed a 
former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be revived unless it shall be expressly so pro-
vided,” but it is not clear that § 108 applies to DOMA’s implied repeal of the preceding stat-
utes. Compare Ventura Cnty. v. Barry, 262 P. 1081, 1082 (Cal. 1927) (finding analogous 
state statute applies to implied repeal), with People ex rel. Hoyne v. Sweitzer, 107 N.E. 902, 
908 (Ill. 1915) (finding analogous state statute does not apply to implied repeal), and City of 
Hannibal v. Guyott, 18 Mo. 515, 520 (1853) (same). Section 108 would also be inapplicable 
if DOMA were judicially invalidated rather than repealed. Cf. Lars Noah, The Executive Line 
Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: What’s the Difference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
235, 243 n.42 (1999). 
177. Respect for Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. (2009) (emphases add-
ed). Later, similar bills include: Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. 
(2011); Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, S. 598, 112th Cong. (2011). 
178. For my argument that Congress should provide a single, cross-cutting rule, see 
notes 241-43 below and accompanying text.  
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all areas of federal law. If one of the proposals passes, it will have plain demo-
cratic legitimacy. Congressional action could also have broader aspirations: For 
example, it could even try to eliminate all federal rules that turn on marital   
status.179  
All the same, it would be a mistake to count on congressional action. One 
can certainly imagine that after DOMA, the chaos that would reign in the fed-
eral courts would earn congressional attention.180 But every generation appar-
ently believes its circumstances are special and will move Congress to act. For 
example, it has been nearly twenty years since Michael Gottesman diagnosed 
state choice-of-law doctrines as “chaotic producers of waste and unfairness” 
and declared that it was “time for Congress to enact a statute or series of stat-
utes declaring federal choice of law rules for categories of disputes that arise 
frequently in multistate contexts.”181 While Gottesman acknowledged “two 
hundred years of congressional inaction,”182 he argued that we were (in 1991) 
“nearing the critical moment at which past practice will be abandoned.”183 In 
particular, Gottesman thought that a rise in product liability cases against cor-
porations would cause them to successfully lobby for uniform choice-of-law 
rules at least in that area. Yet that never happened. And if there has been no 
congressional action on a choice-of-law issue with such high economic stakes 
(and such powerful interests threatened), there is little reason to believe that 
same-sex marriage’s interaction with federal law will be the cutting edge of 
legislative action. 
One possibility worth noting is that Congress could provide a choice-of-
law rule as a method of political subterfuge. Rather than providing a rule out of 
desire for stability, clarity, and interstate harmony, Congress might use choice 
of law to covertly further its own views on same-sex marriage.184 For example, 
a Congress that wished to make marital benefits available to same-sex couples 
without great fuss might provide that marriage for federal purposes would be 
 
179. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123-45 (2008); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in 
Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 852 
(1989) (advocating that tax law be “purged of distinctions based on marital status”). 
180. See Stephen T. Black, Same-Sex Marriage and Taxes, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 327, 351-
52 (2008) (predicting optimistically that Congress would feel obligated to “restore rationali-
ty” to the tax code if DOMA were gone). 
181. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice 
of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991). 
182. Id. at 28; accord RIBSTEIN & O’HARA, supra note 105, at 47-48; Larry Kramer, On 
the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134, 2144 n.23 (1991) 
(“[G]etting choice of law onto the national agenda in Congress is unrealistic.”); Michael W. 
McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Liability Reform, 37 PROC. ACAD. POL. 
SCI., no. 1, 1988, at 90 (1988). 
183. Gottesman, supra note 181, at 28. 
184. Of course it is true that Congress is a collective body that may not have a single 
view on same-sex marriage. I refer to Congress’s “views” as shorthand for the various forms 
of collective intent, desire, or policy that can coherently be attributed to Congress. 
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judged by the law of the place of celebration. Same-sex marriages will usually 
satisfy this requirement, because the couple will of course usually marry in a 
jurisdiction that permits them to.185 Or alternatively, a Congress that was hos-
tile to same-sex marriage might respond to DOMA’s demise by enacting a 
more restrictive choice-of-law rule—perhaps one that would recognize same-
sex marriage only if it was permitted by the law of the place of celebration and 
the law of both parties’ domiciles, and perhaps any other interested state. If it is 
true that choice of law is of much lower salience than substantive law (as Con-
gress’s indifference to the former might imply), then meddling with a choice-
of-law rule might provide a low-profile way for Congress to push federal policy 
in its preferred direction. 
In Part VI, I provide my own proposal for how Congress should act. 
Whether Congress will ultimately choose to do so—or act at all—is a predic-
tion that is beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, the expertise necessary to 
make that prediction probably lies in the domain of political strategy, not 
scholarly analysis.186 I hope that it suffices to say that while congressional ac-
tion is possible, it is not certain, and that even if it does come, it may not come 
for a while. So it is worthwhile to examine the alternatives to legislation. 
C. Regulatory Choice of Law 
In the face of congressional inaction, administrative agencies might fill the 
gap instead. Congress frequently fails to legislate the pesky implementing de-
tails of the statutes it passes, and agencies fill the gap by issuing regulations to 
which the courts might defer. As with congressional choice of law, there is 
some precedent for administrative choice-of-law determinations with respect to 
marriage. For example, in the 1940s, under the National Service Life Insurance 
Act (a predecessor to the benefits statute at issue in Tatum and Brinson), the 
Administrator of Veterans Affairs had promulgated regulations providing that 
marriages be proved “according to the law of the place where the parties resid-
ed at the time of marriage, or at the time and place where the parties resided 
when rights to compensation or pension accrued.”187 As with the current bene-
fits statute, the regulation did not fully resolve the choice-of-law problem, since 
it provided no guidance for choosing between the time-of-marriage residence 
and the time-of-accrued-right residence. But all the same, federal courts at the 
 
185. But see sources cited supra note 60 (discussing unlawful same-sex marriages cele-
brated in San Francisco). 
186. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 1154, 1172 (2006) (“A plausible division of labor is that the reformer should delib-
erately ignore political feasibility; she should simply propose first-best plans and programs 
and then let politics itself filter the feasible from the infeasible.”).  
187. 38 C.F.R. § 3.49(a) (1949), quoted in United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44, 47 
(D.C. Cir. 1949).  
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time upheld the regulation, and apparently found it helpful in guiding their 
choice of law.188 
Agencies can also create law through administrative adjudications rather 
than regulation. In Howerton, the court noted that the Board of Immigration 
Appeals judged the validity of a marriage by looking to the law of the state 
where it was celebrated,189 a rule apparently employed by immigration authori-
ties, with some exceptions, for most of the twentieth century.190 Other adminis-
trative rulings and adjudications have sprung up from time to time—for exam-
ple, in tax191 and in workers’ compensation.192 But they have never attempted 
to thoroughly resolve the conflicts problem, and they have not always arisen in 
circumstances meriting deference.  
While agency resolution has some of the virtues of congressional resolu-
tion, it also may be inadequate to solve the post-DOMA choice-of-law prob-
lem. There is no single federal agency in charge of marriage. As discussed 
above, DOMA cuts a swath through thousands of different statutes and regula-
tions within the jurisdiction of many different administrative bodies—the So-
cial Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, and more. Each body would presumably have to separately 
provide its own marital choice-of-law rules, and those rules might differ, just as 
the Bureau of Immigration Affairs and the Veterans Administration provided 
different choice-of-law rules in their respective fields. That could mean that a 
couple is married for purposes of some federal statutes but not others, potential-
ly leading to odd conflicts.193 Courts may well conclude that Congress general-
ly intended marriage to have a uniform meaning throughout the U.S. Code,194 
and hence not to leave it up to uncoordinated agency action.195 Deference is 
more likely in the event of coordinated agency action.196 
 
188. See, e.g., Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92, 94 (9th Cir. 1951); Snyder, 177 
F.2d at 47. 
189. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1982).  
190. See generally Titshaw, supra note 7, at 557-95. 
191. Von Tersch v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 415, 419 (1967) (citing Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 
C.B. 60, for proposition that the law of the domicile controls); cf. Patricia A. Cain, DOMA 
and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 513-14 & n.170 (2009) (“Alt-
hough the rule is not clearly and completely stated in the Internal Revenue Code, or in the 
regulations, it is generally assumed that for tax purposes, a couple will be considered as mar-
ried if they are legally married in the state of domicile.”). 
192. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d 1306, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(overturning “new guidelines” established by the Benefits Review Board). 
193. For more discussion of the importance of a uniform marital status, see notes 241-
43 below and accompanying text. 
194. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.  
195. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000); ETSI 
Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 516-17 (1988). 
196. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
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Regulatory uniformity would have to be accomplished through executive 
branch coordination. One possible vehicle for such coordination is the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—an agency within the Office of 
Management and Budget that coordinates the actions of other agencies and 
“has emerged as an enduring, major, but insufficiently appreciated part of the 
national government.”197 Whether through OIRA, or otherwise, the executive 
branch might be able to coordinate a coherent policy of marital choice of 
law.198 
As with the likelihood of legislative response, I can only speculate about 
whether a centralized regulatory response is in fact likely. Recent assessments 
describe “White House involvement, whether through OIRA or other offices,” 
as “uneven and unsystematic,”199 or alternatively as strong but nonetheless 
“declining” over time.200 To be sure, the administration has already taken an 
interest in the problem of DOMA, which might indicate more than the usual 
willingness to coordinate related agency action, but one can never be certain 
which issues will successfully capture the President’s attention and political 
capital. 
As with congressional action, regulatory resolution of the conflicts problem 
seems desirable, but uncertain. So far as I am aware there has been no general 
regulatory attempt to promulgate conflict-of-laws rules for the other occasions 
when federal law interacts with state law. Marriage may be no different. The 
demise of DOMA might make such regulation more necessary, but that is no 
guarantee that it will be supplied. 
V. FEDERAL CHOICE OF LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
It seems at least somewhat likely that neither Congress nor administrative 
agencies will codify conflicts rules for federal statutes that rely on state marital 
status. In that event, the task of interpreting that universe of statutes will fall to 
the courts. In every case in which federal marital status is at issue, they must 
decide what law controls marital status.  
 
197. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995); see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Paul R. Verkuil, Wel-
come to the Constantly Evolving Field of Administrative Law, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) 
(“This shift to central political control under OMB is the administrative law story of the dec-
ade.”). 
198. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 196 (detailing methods of coordina-
tion). 
199. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative 
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94 
(2006). 
200. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investi-
gation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 846 (2003). 
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In a sense, this is nothing new. As we have seen, federal courts have con-
fronted this very problem for many years for every issue of marital status that is 
not already controlled by DOMA. But as we have also seen, it is not a problem 
that they have solved. Federal appellate courts differ markedly in their ap-
proach to these second-order conflicts problems in general, and have also not 
agreed on an approach for marriage specifically. Perhaps they will unify behind 
an approach once DOMA is repealed or invalidated. If not, the Supreme Court 
may find itself forced to intervene. 
It is reasonable to wonder whether resolution is really needed. After all, if 
federal courts have somehow been muddling through without definitive agree-
ment for so long, why will that lack of uniformity suddenly become so much 
less tolerable?  
But the federal disagreement over same-sex marriage after DOMA will be 
different in degree from prior second-order choice-of-law issues. Courts fre-
quently avoided resolving the second-order choice-of-law problem in the past 
by either construing the states’ laws to be similar, or concluding that one state’s 
law would likely qualify as definitive under almost any method. In the same-
sex-marriage context, without DOMA, that will be more difficult. The conflict 
over the legality of same-sex marriage is sharp, so there will rarely be a plausi-
ble way to suggest that the two laws are similar. There are a lot of same-sex 
marriages, and many of them cross state lines.201 So in many cases, there will 
be two states with competing claims to apply their own law, because same-sex 
couples usually marry in states that recognize their marriage, but many states to 
which they might later move or travel refuse to recognize same-sex marriages 
regardless of where they are performed. If even a tiny fraction of those couples 
end up in federal court, these cases will recur far more often than they ever 
have in the past.202 
If courts do recognize the need to consider or reconsider the second-order 
choice-of-law problem, that still leaves the question of how. My view is that 
federal courts should turn to what they have called the “federal common law” 
of conflicts if there is no statutory or regulatory choice-of-law provision. This 
is not because the common law approach is so obviously satisfying, but rather 
because the two viable alternatives are so flawed. This Part therefore proceeds 
in slightly unorthodox order, first discussing the Borax and Klaxon doctrines 
and explaining why they should not be used to solve the second-order choice-
of-law problem, and then defending the legitimacy of the remaining contend-
er—the so-called “federal common law” approach. 
 
201. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
202. See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.20, at 657 (5th ed. 2010) (predict-
ing that state disagreement about same-sex marriage “will give rise to many conflicts prob-
lems”). 
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A. Against Borax 
Recall that one approach to the chaos of choosing state law, the doctrine 
inspired by Borax, is simply to abandon state law in the first place and replace 
it with a federal definition. This is inconsistent with the approach proposed by 
the administration, which says that a same-sex marriage will be respected for 
federal purposes if, but only if, it is valid under state law.203 And there are good 
reasons for the administration’s rejection of Borax—both formal and practical. 
As a formal matter, words like “marriage” or “spouse” do appear to require the 
federal court to investigate the law of a particular state. What distinguishes 
marriage from other emotional, financial, and sexual relationships is largely its 
ceremonial formality.204 To be sure, such ceremonies are sometimes celebrated 
outside of the government’s purview, but the most sensible and intuitive refer-
ent for a law that refers to marriage is to laws that create or recognize marriage. 
As the Supreme Court said in De Sylva, in our system, those are state laws.205 
There are also practical problems with the Borax approach. Imagine trying 
to create a federal definition of marriage that is disconnected from state law. If 
the definition categorically excludes same-sex marriage, even when valid under 
state law, there is little point in (or rationale for) holding DOMA unconstitu-
tional in the first place. Such a federal rule would not be an attempt to work out 
the implications of the administration’s position. It is simply a rejection of that 
position. 
Nor can federal courts easily adopt the opposite rule, recognizing all same-
sex couples as married regardless of state law. As a practical matter, how will 
federal courts know whether a same-sex couple is married if no such marriages 
are lawfully recognized by the state? It is true that state courts have occasional-
ly followed the Second Restatement in recognizing marriages as valid even if 
they were invalid where they were celebrated,206 but only for those with strong 
connections to the forum state, and never on a widespread scale. So adoption of 
this solution might require broader institutional reform—creating a new brigade 
 
203. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
204. The exception is common law marriage, an institution in general disfavor today. 
See Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 
151, 151 (2009). 
205. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“[T]here is no federal law 
of domestic relations.”). 
206. Donlann v. Macgurn, 55 P.3d 74, 77-78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); McPeek v. 
McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171, 175-76 (Ind. 2008); In re Estate of Murnion, 686 P.2d 893, 899 
(Mont. 1984); In re Farraj, 900 N.Y.S.2d 340 (App. Div. 2010); In re Estate of Shippy, 678 
P.2d 848, 850-51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. i (1971); John C. Williams, Annotation, Recognition by Fo-
rum State of Marriage Which, Although Invalid Where Contracted, Would Have Been Valid 
If Contracted Within Forum State, 82 A.L.R.3d 1240 (West 2012) (collecting cases).  
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of federal employees to issue federal marriage licenses in such states,207 or res-
urrecting the institution of common law marriage for these purposes despite its 
general demise at the state level.208 It would be hard for courts to do that simp-
ly in the name of interpreting the recurring phrase “marriage” in federal      
statutes.209 
That leaves an intermediate approach—the one actually championed by 
Borax’s defenders—in which federal courts and administrators decide on an ad 
hoc, all-things-considered basis whether same-sex couples can be “married” for 
purposes of each of the thousand federal laws implicating marriage. That is 
simply unworkable. The approach Reese and Currie championed would have 
been bad enough at the time they proposed it—when purposivist statutory in-
terpretation was in its heyday and when marriage laws were comparatively uni-
form. But in the intervening years, federal courts have moved away from free-
wheeling policy-based interpretation of statutory texts, and the gulf between the 
marriages recognized in different states has grown. The case-by-case federal 
court creation of a federal definition of marriage that Borax and Howerton en-
vision would not extricate the federal government from the same-sex marriage 
conflict nor to help litigants predict their status. 
To be sure, there is a limited but important sense in which the independent 
federal assessment is inevitable. Surely there are some laws we can imagine 
that would use the word “marriage” in such an idiosyncratic context that they 
wouldn’t be incorporated by federal law—imagine a state that for some myste-
rious reason used the word “marriage” to describe all contractual relationships 
of any kind. Indeed, in De Sylva the Supreme Court conceded that “a State 
would [not] be entitled to use the word ‘children’ in a way entirely strange to 
those familiar with its ordinary usage” before adding that “at least to the extent 
that there are permissible variations in the ordinary concept of ‘children’ we 
deem state law controlling.”210 But the whole premise of a world where 
DOMA is invalidated or repealed is that it is at least “permissible” for the fed-
eral government to use the word marriage to include state-sanctioned same-sex 
marriages. So we are inside the zone of state law, not on the periphery where an 
independent rule might be required. 
Not for nothing has the Borax/Howerton approach been criticized as “re-
moved from our expertise”211 and repeatedly held to be inconsistent with fed-
 
207. Cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving Interstate Conflicts over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 47, 91-92 (2011) (predicting, tentatively, a system of federally-celebrated 
civil unions). 
208. Cf. Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931 (2011) 
(arguing that common law marriages provide unique advantages to same-sex couples). 
209. For a discussion of whether Congress should adopt a federal marriage policy even 
if the courts cannot do so on their own, see Part VI.A below. 
210. 351 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added). 
211. Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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eral law.212 State law is and should be an integral part of determining a cou-
ple’s marital status, and the task of federal courts should be figuring out how to 
synthesize and select among those laws, not reinventing the institution at the 
federal level. 
B. Against Klaxon 
The more promising but ultimately unworkable alternative to federal com-
mon law is the Klaxon doctrine, under which federal courts would apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the state where the district court sits (as they currently do 
in diversity cases decided under Erie). There is some logic to extending Klax-
on. The argument might go like this: most courts and commentators agree that 
Erie “applies to ‘state law issues’ in federal question cases as well” as in diver-
sity.213 (Puzzlingly, the Supreme Court appears not to have weighed in.214) 
And if Klaxon follows directly from Erie, it makes sense that Klaxon would 
apply in federal question cases too.215  
But at a legal level, this logic breaks down. For one thing, Klaxon does not 
follow directly from Erie.216 Erie tells federal courts to apply some state’s law 
rather than making general law; but Klaxon does not simply say that federal 
courts should apply some state’s choice-of-law rules. It requires federal courts 
to use the rules of a particular state—a state chosen because of the policies un-
derlying diversity jurisdiction.  
Those policies do not apply as directly to cases interpreting federal law, 
and in fact there are two decisive reasons not to extend Klaxon to such cases. 
The first is the different role of forum-shopping. Klaxon was justified by a de-
sire for equality between diverse and nondiverse cases in a given state. “Other-
wise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal 
 
212. See Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d 1306, 1313-14 & n.6 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (collecting cases).  
213. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 881, 912 n.141 (1986); accord Camacho v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 445 F.3d 407, 
409 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2006); First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Mobile, Ala. v. First S. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n of Jackson Cnty., Miss., 614 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1980); Maternally Yours, Inc. 
v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956); Henry J. Friendly, In 
Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408 n.122 
(1964); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 311 (2008). 
214. Cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 164 n.2 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[N]either [Erie] nor the Rules of Decision Act scholarship 
underlying it . . . remotely established that that statute applies only in diversity cases.”). But 
see D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465-73 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(arguing that Erie is limited to diversity cases). 
215. See In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 607 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Klaxon in 
reliance on the Second Circuit’s ruling in Maternally Yours). 
216. Cf. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208 n.2 (1938) (treating the Klaxon 
rule as an open question after Erie was decided). 
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administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by 
side.”217 But Klaxon embraces a different form of inequality. Different federal 
courts across the country will choose different law to apply to the same        
dispute.218 
In diversity, no approach can ensure horizontal uniformity between all fed-
eral courts considering an issue and vertical uniformity between all courts (state 
and federal) sitting in a given state. The question is which type of inequality to 
embrace. Klaxon concluded that it was better to retain uniformity between 
courts in a given state, noting that inequality from state to state was already a 
necessary cost of diversity jurisdiction.219 The Klaxon rule replicates that ine-
quality, but it does not make it worse.  
In federal question cases, things are different. Recall that state courts must 
follow federal choice-of-law rules in interpreting the words in federal stat-
utes.220 So whatever the federal choice-of-law rule, there will be vertical uni-
formity between federal and state courts in a given state. Horizontal uniformity 
is also thought to be important when a nationwide federal statute is at issue, and 
by abandoning Klaxon, it is possible to have that too. A rule that (unlike Klax-
on) is not forum-dependent will produce both horizontal and vertical            
uniformity. 
The second, even more important, reason to limit Klaxon to diversity cases 
is that Klaxon provides no guidance to the executive branch outside of litiga-
tion. Klaxon is a juricentric decision. It tells “federal courts” to do what state 
courts would do in the state where the federal district court is located.221 But 
when no litigation has begun, there is no federal district court, so Klaxon can-
not say what to do. This problem comes up rarely in diversity cases because the 
executive is seldom called upon to execute state law in the absence of a federal 
law issue. But it is a huge issue with federal law because the executive is the 
primary enforcer of federal law, including law pertaining to marriage. It is the 
executive who initially decides who receives federal benefits, or whose taxes 
are improperly filed. Often those determinations go unchallenged, and when 
they are challenged, it is in a separate judicial proceeding that takes the execu-
tive decision as a starting point. 
 
217. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); see also Lembcke 
v. United States, 181 F.2d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[W]here [diversity] is the basis of juris-
diction it is inadmissible that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in the state 
courts and another for litigants who bring the same question before the federal courts sitting 
within the state.”). 
218. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
219. Id. 
220. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
221. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added); see also id. at 496 (“The conflict of 
laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in 
Delaware’s state courts.”). 
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If Klaxon controlled, the executive would have to guess in which district 
litigation might eventually be filed before it could figure out which law to ap-
ply. Frequently, there will be no determinate answer. A single executive action 
might well produce multiple plaintiffs, who could plausibly bring suit in differ-
ent states. Klaxon would produce different answers in each suit.222 Even a sin-
gle plaintiff might well have a choice about where to file suit, and in such a 
case, the plaintiff can always choose a jurisdiction precisely because it will 
yield a choice-of-law rule different from the one the executive applied. Because 
of the court-focused nature of the Klaxon rule, no matter how the executive 
chooses law under Klaxon, that choice is almost guaranteed to be wrong if the 
plaintiff wants it to be. 
Nor could the executive adopt a modified version of Klaxon by applying 
the law of the state in which the executive officer sits. The Supreme Court has 
rejected attempts to “modif[y]” Klaxon in the past.223 And this modification 
would make the accident of the location of an administrative office control the 
outcome of the case—a result that is implausible and arbitrary even by choice-
of-law standards—and would grant peculiar import to the internal assignment 
of administrative work. It would also produce a potential mismatch when the 
executive officer’s action is challenged in federal court, if the federal court sat 
in a different state than the officer did. Any choice-of-law rule that causes the 
executive and the courts to disagree even when they apply the rule correctly is 
a bad rule. Klaxon should thus be limited to diversity jurisdiction, where it    
began.224  
Once Klaxon is analyzed through the lens of DOMA, the problem of hav-
ing a juricentric conflicts doctrine is revealed. Conflicts doctrines that produce 
sensible results in the private law context cannot always survive exposure to the 
policies of public law. 
C. The Legitimacy of a “Federal Common Law” Solution 
Because neither Klaxon nor Borax is a tenable solution to federal choice of 
law, federal courts should instead apply what they have called the federal 
common law of conflicts. Applying generally accepted choice-of-law princi-
ples, federal courts should articulate the best rule they can for filling in the stat-
utory gap left by Congress’s failure to provide a choice-of-law rule of its own. 
 
222. See id. at 496. 
223. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam). 
224. Some modern scholars have criticized Klaxon, suggesting that it is a bad decision 
even in its original context of diversity cases. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diver-
sity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 117-23 (1993); Laycock, supra note 97, at 282; Caleb Nelson, The Per-
sistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that 
question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original 
context. 
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Yet some question the legitimacy of this sort of federal common law. For 
example, when the Second Circuit announced that it was abandoning the com-
mon law approach to federal choice of law, it did so because it thought “[t]he 
ability of the federal courts to create federal common law and displace state 
created rules is severely limited.”225 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit declared that 
even in federal cases, federal courts may not “craft a choice-of-law rule out of 
whole cloth.”226 
These courts are wrong to be so skeptical of the so-called federal common 
law approach to choice of law. For one thing, there is an important sense in 
which even Klaxon is an embodiment of a federal common law approach to 
choice of law, not a rejection of it. State substantive law applies where federal 
law does not. That is what Erie says;227 that is what the Rules of Decision Act 
says.228 But the Rules of Decision Act (quoted by Erie) explicitly reserves the 
nonsubstantive question of “where [state laws] apply.”229 For that determina-
tion—what state laws apply where—choice of law is inevitable.230 Where no 
choice is dictated by federal law and where states do not agree, there is no al-
ternative to federal common law.  
At most, federal common law skeptics might subscribe to part of Klaxon’s 
rule—the part that requires federal courts to use some state’s choice-of-law 
rules, rather than looking only to the state’s substantive law (this is called look-
ing to the state’s “whole law”).231 But one could well imagine other choices 
about which state’s choice-of-law rules to use—Klaxon’s particular choice is 
far from inevitable. So federal common law skeptics should not be able to ob-
ject to a law that makes a different choice of whole law—for example, the 
choice-of-law rules of the state of domicile. Klaxon’s rule to use the forum 
state’s whole law is just as much of a federal common law choice. 
But the federal common law skeptics are wrong for a much deeper reason, 
too. The “federal common law” used to choose what state’s law a federal stat-
ute relies on is nothing like the sort of federal common law prohibited by Erie. 
There is no prohibition on this sort of federal common law in interpreting    
statutes. 
A nearly unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg last Term summarized the 
doctrine well: 
 
225. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001). 
226. A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
227. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
229. Id. See generally Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 51-54 (2011) (surveying the possible meaning of this caveat). 
230. Cf. James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1509, 1509 (2008) (“[C]hoice of law is the starting point in any legal analysis . . . .”). 
231. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980 (1991). 
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 “There is no federal general common law,” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins fa-
mously recognized. In the wake of Erie, however, a keener understanding de-
veloped. Erie “le[ft] to the states what ought be left to them,” and thus re-
quired “federal courts [to] follow state decisions on matters of substantive law 
appropriately cognizable by the states.” Erie also sparked “the emergence of a 
federal decisional law in areas of national concern.” The “new” federal com-
mon law addresses “subjects within national legislative power where Congress 
has so directed” or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so demands.232 
In particular, the Court noted, under the new, “‘specialized federal com-
mon law,’” “federal courts may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if necessary, 
even ‘fashion federal law.’”233 
Similarly, as Caleb Nelson has chronicled, even after Erie, federal courts 
continue to articulate common law rules “to fill gaps in federal statutes or to 
handle issues that arise in enclaves of pure federal common law.”234 Such 
lawmaking is consistent with Erie and with the “severe[] limit[s]”235 on federal 
lawmaking so long as it concerns issues that “are genuinely within the federal 
domain.”236 
There are some legitimate debates about the scope of this new form of fed-
eral common law.237 But it should be hard to dispute that deciding which 
state’s law Congress has chosen to rely upon is “genuinely within the federal 
domain.”238 It is a subject on which Congress could provide a clear answer, and 
it is a subject on which state law cannot provide an answer by itself precisely 
because it is disputed which state’s law governs. Deciding what state’s law 
Congress has chosen to rely upon—even by resort to common law principles—
is a necessary part of a federal court’s job. 
VI. CHOOSING LAW 
The preceding two Parts have laid out what framework different federal in-
stitutions can use to solve the federal choice-of-law problem left by DOMA’s 
demise. But that leaves the question of what rule they should actually use. As 
 
232. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011) (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Friendly, supra note 213, at 405, 422). 
233. Id. (quoting Friendly, supra note 213, at 405, 421). 
234. Nelson, supra note 224, at 568 (emphasis omitted). 
235. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001). 
236. Nelson, supra note 224, at 565. 
237. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 731, 758-59 (2010) (canvassing disagreement). 
238. Nelson, supra note 224, at 565; accord Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (de-
scribing the question as “within national legislative power” (quoting Friendly, supra note 
213, at 422)). 
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this Part will detail, the latter question cannot be answered categorically. The 
proper rule depends on which institution imposes it.239 
A. Statutory Rules for Marriage 
Suppose that Congress240 is willing to respond to the federal choice-of-law 
problem, either in the course of repealing DOMA itself, or in response to judi-
cial action. There are at least three choices Congress must make in crafting its 
response: (1) it must choose whether to have a single transsubstantive rule for 
all federal laws concerning marriage or instead to have different rules for dif-
ferent laws; (2) it must decide whether to incorporate state law or create a new 
federal definition, unrelated to state law; and (3) it must decide which state’s 
law (if state law is used) or what non-state rule it will use.  
First: As a theoretical matter, a single transsubstantive rule better reflects 
the nature of marriage. Marriage creates a new legal relationship from which 
countless other rules flow. It is not something that can be replicated through a 
set of contracts. Rather, the Supreme Court has called it “something more than 
a mere contract,”241 something that “involves declarations of status.”242 Many 
scholars have said the same.243 One important aspect of this is that it is some-
thing you are or aren’t, and it provides a single answer to the question where it 
is relevant. The federal rule should reflect this reality, and it should aim to 
make the marriage rule a single rule rather than a multiplicity of different ones.  
This theory also makes sense at a more practical level. Multiple federal 
rules for marriage would add massively to the complication of writing the law 
and, more importantly, to living under it. Moreover, having different choice-of-
law rules for different statutes can mismatch statutes that were meant to work 
together. For instance, the total benefit package due to the spouse of a deceased 
veteran or federal employee will likely be calculated under the assumption that 
the spouse would simultaneously be eligible for social security, spousal benefit 
programs, and the like. Splitting up the choice of marital law for each statute 
 
239. For more on institutional role and interpretive method, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 63-85 (2006). 
240. I do not further discuss the separate hypothesis of agency creation of a federal 
choice-of-law rule, which I suspect would follow along similar lines. 
241. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888). 
242. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
243. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1306, 
1308-09 (2010); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1766 (2005); 
Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1983) 
(reviewing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE 
LAW (1981)); see also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: 
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 454-90 (1998) (marriage cannot be 
replicated through simple contract). In contrasting status and contract I do not mean to in-
voke the issue of when and how the parties should be able to terminate the marriage. See 
Stinson, supra note 79, at 10-11. 
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can undermine those calculations. Such conflicts are generally pointless and 
avoidable. There might be rare occasions where some other, statute-specific 
policy (like ERISA’s primacy for plan documents) justifies deviating from this 
presumption, but generally, to the extent Congress wants to have different rules 
for different statutes, it can do that by having different substantive rules; it need 
not pack them into the definition of marriage.  
As for the second choice: Congress should also continue to rely upon state 
law to determine the validity of a marriage, as it has done for marital status de-
terminations (other than the same-sex issue) in the past. Marital validity impli-
cates issues of age, consent, relationship, residence, capacity, divorce, and 
more. Congress can avoid the administrative difficulty of regulating each of 
these issues by devolving it to the state level. 
Relying on state law also gently vindicates federalism. Henry Hart taught 
us that federal law should be “interstitial,” filling in the gaps between predomi-
nant state law.244 This was in keeping with James Madison’s promise that the 
federal government’s powers would be “few and defined,” and “exercised prin-
cipally on external objects,” while the states’ powers would be “numerous and 
indefinite.”245  
The arguments for federalism are doubtless familiar, and they are true here. 
If it turns out that a single vision of marriage is the most persuasive in state 
courts and legislatures, then federal law will bear that out—that single vision 
will be reflected in the state laws Congress relies upon. In contrast, if multiple 
visions of marriage continue to hold sway, then each one can potentially be re-
flected at the federal level. As one scholar claimed when defending the enact-
ment of DOMA’s full faith and credit provisions, “Whatever one’s view on the 
merits of the social question, the advantages of using the ‘laboratories of de-
mocracy’ provided by our decentralized, 50-state system, to test the results, be-
fore moving to a new national definition of marriage, should [be] apparent.”246 
And of course they are subject to the caveat that if the Federal Constitution is 
best read as imposing a single rule for this or any aspect of marriage, state (and 
hence federal) law will naturally bear that out.247 But any such constitutional 
norms should be enforced through forthright constitutional interpretation, not 
through the kind of top-down mandate reflected in DOMA. 
 
244. Hart, supra note 5, at 498. 
245. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
246. Letter from Michael W. McConnell to Senator Orrin Hatch (July 10, 1996), re-
printed in The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 104th Cong. 57 (1996). 
247. Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-1003 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (holding that laws forbidding same-sex marriage violate fundamental rights and equal 
protection), with Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming on 
narrower grounds). 
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As readers will expect, the most difficult question is the third: which state’s 
law, exactly, Congress should turn to. Much as one might like to separate struc-
ture and substance, it is not entirely possible here. In practice, following only 
the law of the place of celebration will lead to more widespread recognition of 
same-sex marriage than would following the law of the parties’ current domi-
cile. Most couples choose to marry someplace where their marriage is recog-
nized,248 but may have less opportunity to choose where they live on that basis. 
(Those who seek truly results-oriented rules need not stop there; one could im-
agine creating choice-of-law rules such as “follow the most restrictive state that 
has had minimum contacts with the marriage” or “follow the most permissive 
state that has had minimum contacts with the marriage.”) 
On balance, I think that Congress should pass the choice-of-law rule con-
tained in H.R. 1116, the Respect for Marriage Act: the marriage is valid if valid 
in the state where it was celebrated (or, if not from a state, if valid in the place 
it was celebrated and in some state).249 The rule is good because it promotes 
predictability and stability, which are especially desirable in the context of mar-
riage. As discussed above, marriage is not simply the resolution of a single le-
gal issue, but a meta-legal issue designed to frame the resolution of a thousand 
other legal issues.250 Marriage is also a substantially enduring relationship. 
Marriages can generally be terminated, to be sure, but they are terminated un-
der carefully regulated circumstances with rules for fights over property, fi-
nances, and children. Married couples expect that, legal quirks aside, when they 
marry they will remain married unless and until they formally divorce. Same-
sex couples may not have the same guarantees with respect to state law, but at 
least with respect to nationwide federal law, they can and should.251 
Of course, one can agree with the objectives I have described here without 
necessarily coming to the same conclusion. The goal of stability and orderly 
representation is served fairly well by any rule that relies on facts known at the 
time of celebration. Thus one might argue that Congress should instead adopt a 
rule that looks to the conflicts law of the couple’s domicile when they married. 
Many couples have the ability to travel to a state that will recognize their mar-
riage,252 but it is harder for couples to manipulate their domicile for marriage-
related reasons, so a domicile-based rule might be less susceptible to a certain 
kind of manipulation. This rule is also in keeping with some readings of the 
 
248. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
249. Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011). 
250. See Bray, supra note 243, at 1306-09 (discussing the need for certainty about legal 
statuses). 
251. Scholars and advocates are fond of citing Justice Jackson’s dissent in Estin v. Estin 
for this point. 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“If there is one thing that 
the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable indi-
viduals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom.”). 
252. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to 
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 780-97 (1995). 
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First and Second Restatements,253 although very few states have actually 
adopted it as their choice-of-law rule for same-sex marriages.  
On balance, however, I think it is an inferior rule. While it may be less sub-
ject to forum-shopping at the time the couple decides to marry, it is subject to a 
different form of manipulation. Because a couple’s domicile turns on facts 
about their intent to move and to remain, it is subject to post hoc manipulation; 
the couple can later recharacterize their intent, to make their marriage valid or 
invalid as they wish. By contrast, the place-of-celebration rule forces the couple 
to make a single choice at the time of their marriage (they will usually choose 
for it to be valid) rather than giving the opportunity to claim it valid or invalid 
later. (Recall that marriage is in some legal contexts a benefit and in others a 
burden.254) Bad faith aside, the domicile-at-the-time-of-marriage rule is for 
similar reasons significantly harder to adjudicate. It turns not just on a single 
easily ascertainable fact, but a muddle of facts that are harder to consistently 
determine. 
Lynn Wardle also objects to the bill’s proposed rule on the grounds that it 
“is substantively biased to circumvent state policies that do not allow or recog-
nize same-sex marriage,” and will sometimes lead to federal recognition of a 
marriage “in defiant disregard” of what the couple’s domiciliary state would 
do.255 It is true that the place-of-celebration rule will probably lead to more 
recognition, and that it gives the domicile a diminished role. The same com-
plaints, in reverse, could be made about Wardle’s apparent preference for the 
domicile. There is no getting around the “substantive[] biase[s]” caught up in 
the conflicts rule, and that is all the more reason that the decision is ultimately 
up to Congress. 
B. Common Law Rules for Marriage 
Suppose Congress does not act after DOMA’s demise, leaving courts to 
figure out what common law choice-of-law rules govern the validity of a mar-
riage. There is no such rule already established. There is no clear consensus 
rule among state courts for federal courts to adopt as their own. Perhaps a plu-
rality of courts and federal tribunals start with the Second Restatement of Con-
flicts,256 but others do not.257 Even those that do regularly turn to the Second 
Restatement also rely on choice-of-law decisions from non-Restatement cir-
cuits, declaring them “part of the body of federal common law” regardless of 
 
253. See supra notes 89, 95, and accompanying text. 
254. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
255. Wardle, supra note 34, at 983-84. 
256. Nelson, supra note 224, at 541. 
257. Id. at 541-42; see also supra Part III.A. 
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their consistency with the Restatement.258 Moreover, the Second Restatement’s 
approach is so open-ended that even among jurisdictions that purport to follow 
it, there is much disagreement about what it requires.259  
The underlying policy concerns are also contestable. It may well be that 
many people’s (and many judges’) views about what rule should control have 
more to do with their attitude toward state laws forbidding same-sex marriage 
than with neutrally defensible principles.260 Those who see same-sex marriage 
as a fundamental right naturally resist the idea that state law can cause it to 
wink out of existence even once a couple has been married for years.261 Those 
who think refusal to recognize same-sex marriage is an entirely legitimate ex-
ercise of state sovereignty are more likely to think that the federal government 
should credit the public policy objections of a new domicile.262 If eliminating 
DOMA was supposed to keep federal courts out of the debate over the legiti-
macy of same-sex marriage, a federal law of marital conflicts seems to thrust 
them right back in. 
Precisely because of this contestation, courts must proceed differently from 
legislatures. While Congress can create choice-of-law rules by legislating them, 
the courts can create them only by interpreting what Congress has done. One 
does not have to be Justice Scalia263 to agree that a federal common law rule 
does not mean “the statute we would have written if we were in Congress.” Ra-
ther, common law is supposed to fill in the gaps between the laws Congress has 
adopted. 
Like Congress, the courts must decide whether to have a single 
transsubstantive common law rule for all federal laws concerning marriage or 
instead to have different rules for different laws. While courts have resisted a 
categorical presumption that a single word means the same thing throughout 
 
258. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922-23 
(6th Cir. 2006); see also Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 570 (2001), cited in 
Nelson, supra note 224, at 541 n.192. 
259. Nelson, supra note 224, at 542; see also supra note 97. 
260. Indeed, many of those who have read drafts of this Article have tended to regard 
one choice-of-law solution as obviously superior—but there has been wide disagreement on 
which solution this is! 
261. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 17 (“It would be ri-
diculous to have people’s marital status blink on and off like a strobe light as they jet across 
the country.”). 
262. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism in 
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1703, 1801. 
263. Cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be 
unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, which is 
to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing 
what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”). 
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the U.S. Code,264 such a presumption is sensible here because of marriage’s 
transsubstantive status. 
To be sure, there might be individual federal statutes that should be treated 
as exceptions to the transsubstantive choice-of-law rule. Of course, to the ex-
tent Congress has chosen a particular choice-of-law rule, that rule would con-
trol. And in some borderline cases, where a statute is sufficiently close to hav-
ing a specific congressionally-mandated choice of law, courts might properly 
apply that choice as well. One likely example of such a statute is ERISA. Re-
call that in DaimlerChrysler, the Sixth Circuit thought that the federal common 
law of conflicts authorized it to disregard a different choice-of-law determina-
tion provided by the ERISA plan.265 But just a few years after that case, the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that plan administrators must “hew[] to the 
directives of the plan documents” rather than circumventing them with court-
invented common law rules,266 and the Sixth Circuit had already been follow-
ing that plan-documents rule for years.267 This doctrine went unmentioned in 
DaimlerChrysler, though a dissenting judge criticized the majority for “not 
tak[ing] into account the overriding purpose and policy of uniformity behind 
the ERISA statute or behind the interpretation of ERISA benefits contracts.”268 
Other courts also appear to have been confused about the extent to which they 
should follow ERISA choice-of-law provisions that incorporate state law 
terms.269 In light of the plan-documents doctrine established by the Supreme 
Court, the better rule for ERISA cases is to follow a marital choice-of-law rule 
required by the plan documents.270 
 
264. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 n.8 (2004) 
(“The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in 
connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all 
of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must 
constantly be guarded against.” (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Proce-
dure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933)). 
265. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 928 (6th 
Cir. 2006), discussed in more detail above at notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
266. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for Dupont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300 (2009). 
267. See McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990) (cited in Dupont, 555 U.S. 
at 304). 
268. DaimlerChrysler, 448 F.3d at 928-29 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
269. See Buce v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1133, 1148 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(noting some disagreement with Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Doe, 140 F.3d 785 
(8th Cir.1998); Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.1996); and In re Sears Retiree Group 
Life Insurance Litigation, 90 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ill. 2000)); see also id. at 1153-54 
(Barkett, J., concurring); id. at 1154-55 (Carnes, J., concurring in the result). 
270. In contrast, I am more skeptical of those who have treated bankruptcy jurisdiction 
as a separate category for purposes of the Klaxon/choice-of-law problem. Some say that 
Klaxon should be especially applicable to bankruptcy. See In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 
F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1988); accord Note, supra note 5, at 1227-28. Others say that it 
should be especially inapplicable there. See In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995); 
accord Chapman, supra note 6, at *8-9; Gardina, supra note 6, at 923. I see little evidence 
that Congress intended bankruptcy to be a special case either way. 
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For reasons already explained, federal courts cannot and should not create 
a federal definition of marriage out of the cloth of statutory interpretation. Ra-
ther, they can and should apply state law. That leaves the important questions 
of which state’s law to apply and whether to apply that state’s substantive law 
or instead its whole law (including choice of law). This is where institutional 
role kicks in. 
Federal courts should follow the whole law of the parties’ domicile. As we 
have seen, marital conflicts doctrine has in large part been an attempt to medi-
ate between the interests of the state of the parties’ domicile and the state where 
the marriage was celebrated. Different states have subscribed to different theo-
retical approaches about how to mediate between those interests. But the feder-
al government does not have an approach of its own, so courts must borrow the 
whole law of some state that does.271 The state best situated to mediate be-
tween those interests is the parties’ current domicile. As we have seen, the par-
ties’ current domicile will sometimes choose to recognize a marriage that 
would not be valid there, and sometimes it will decide that its preference is so 
strong that it invalidates the marriage entirely. By relying on the choice-of-law 
rules of the marital domicile, the federal government comes as close as possible 
to taking itself out of the equation. Federal courts should therefore treat parties 
as married if their home state—their domicile—treats them that way.272 
This is not the rule that I advocate Congress adopt. But federal courts are 
differently situated. Courts must take their policy cues from Congress. Con-
gress can provide its own cues. A world without DOMA and with no further 
congressional direction presupposes that the federal government can and should 
minimize its own role in recognizing marriage. It does that best by not trying to 
mediate between the interests of competing states on its own, but rather by pre-
selecting a state as mediator. 
What is more, the domicile-based doctrine is consistent with the scattered 
statutory provisions that govern marital choice of law for veterans’ and social 
security benefits.273 The Social Security Act provides that spousal-status de-
terminations turn on the law “of the State in which [the] insured individual is 
domiciled,”274 and the veterans’ benefits statute similarly turns on “the law of 
the place where the parties resided.”275 To the extent there are any congres-
 
271. For some of the reasons for using a state’s whole law, see Richards v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1962). 
272. As others have noted, occasionally two spouses will have different domiciles. 
KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 90; Laycock, supra note 97, at 325. Find-
ing the appropriate marital domicile in such a case (the more permissive, the more restric-
tive, the older, the more expensive) strikes me as a solvable detail. Perhaps the rule could be 
borrowed from one of the existing federal rules based on domicile. 
273. See supra notes 174-75. 
274. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
275. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c). The veterans’ benefits statute looks to where the parties resid-
ed “when the right to benefits accrued” (or, alternatively, when they were married), id., so it 
does not fit perfectly into this scheme. It is a separate, and interesting, question how courts 
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sionally imposed guideposts, they point in the direction of domicile.276 A dif-
ferent common law solution would create inconsistency with those provisions, 
and it is therefore better propagated by Congress. 
To be sure, such a solution will not be the simplest one to administer. It 
will not always be clear what a state’s stance on recognizing out-of-state same-
sex marriages is, especially if one finds the state anti-recognition statutes am-
biguous, or subject to narrow construction. But if the issue remains one of con-
tinuing importance in federal court, it will likely remain one of continuing im-
portance in state court as well, and federal courts generally defer to state court 
construction of state law.277 If a state’s courts haven’t decided yet, and a feder-
al court doesn’t wish to figure it out on its own, it can also certify a question to 
those courts.278 At any rate, common law rules should not always maximize 
clarity at the expense of other considerations.  
There are other details to flesh out as well. For example, in international 
cases—marriages by couples that have no American domicile at all—my views 
are even more tentative, but again I think that the domiciliary solution makes 
the most sense. With little other congressional guidance, federal courts should 
look to the whole law of the couple’s foreign domicile. To be sure, extending 
the domestic conflicts rule to foreign domiciliaries might result in federal 
courts recognizing some marriages which are very different from those created 
here, such as polygamous marriages. But whatever one thinks of polygamy, I 
do not think that point is fatal. For one thing, American courts actually have 
recognized polygamous marriages, at least for some purposes.279 More im-
portantly, if recognizing such foreign marriages really is seen as unacceptable, 
 
should deal with this federal conflicts problem when it intersects with a right that vests over 
time or at a particular time. Cf. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 
YALE L.J. 1277, 1286 (1989). For example, immigration proceedings related to marriage can 
take several years, and one might question whether federal courts should have to reinquire 
into a couple’s marital status if their domicile changes during that period. 
276. The arguable exception is a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that 
requires those petitioning for spousal permanent residence to attest that their marriage was 
“entered into in accordance with the laws of the place where the marriage took place.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). Perhaps this provision could justify carving out a special rule 
for some immigration cases, like ERISA cases. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying 
text. I, however, am inclined to see it as an antifraud measure rather than a choice-of-law 
hint. But see Titshaw, supra note 7, at 558 (acknowledging that this section is not a defini-
tion or a choice-of-law provision, though arguing that it reflects congressional approval for 
the place-of-celebration rule). 
277. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Pos-
itivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495-517, 1535-44 
(1997) (comparing different theories of deference). 
278. Id. at 1544-63 (discussing and praising certification). 
279. See KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 50, at 29-32 (collecting cases rec-
ognizing polygamous marriages by Native Americans); see also Scott Titshaw, Sorry 
Ma’am, Your Baby Is an Alien: Outdated Immigration Rules and Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 95 n.221 (2010) (collecting Board of Immigration 
Appeals decisions). 
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Congress can always provide a statutory solution like the one I describe 
above.280 It is better for the courts to leave such objections to Congress than to 
wade into the field themselves without guidance. 
VII. BEYOND DOMA 
A. Interstitial Law 
This Article has analyzed the specific case of federal laws that rely upon 
the state-defined institution of marriage. But there are other instances of what 
I—following Henry Hart—call “interstitial” law.281 Some are regulatory: For 
example, federal bankruptcy law frequently turns on “‘property’ and ‘interests 
in property’” which “are creatures of state law.”282 Federal tax law places simi-
lar reliance on state property and other commercial rights.283 Social security 
relies not only on the state law of marriage, but also on state domestic relations 
law.284 Some courts rely on state law in adjudicating claims under 
CERCLA.285 Others are criminal: federal habeas deadlines turn on prior events 
under state law,286 and federal law’s reliance on prior convictions under state 
law is the subject of endless litigation.287 Some are territorial: In federal en-
claves, the Assimilative Crimes Act incorporates the criminal law of the state 
“in which such place is situated.”288 In 1971, President Nixon ordered military 
bases to follow the abortion law of the state where they were located.289 And 
there are more.290  
 
280. I am assuming, tentatively again, that Congress has not done so already. Congress 
has historically passed several laws disfavoring polygamy, and while many have been re-
pealed, see, e.g., Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 864 (repealing territorial 
antipolygamy offenses previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 513 (1946)), some have not, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (“Any immigrant who is coming to the United States to practice 
polygamy is inadmissible.”). Thanks to Kent Olsen for research on this point. 
281. Hart, supra note 5, at 498. 
282. Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992). 
283. See Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation: 
Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 OR. L. REV. 781, 782-83 (1992); Covey T. Oliver, The Nature 
of the Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 638, 
639 (1953); Note, supra note 5, at 1216-17. 
284. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006); see also Astrue v. Capato, No. 11-159, 
2012 WL 1810219 (U.S. May 21, 2012) (discussing § 416(h)(2)(A)). 
285. Michael Carter, Comment, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: It’s Time to Fully 
Embrace State Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 767 (2008). 
286. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 120-21 (2009). 
287. E.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); United States v. Hayes, 555 
U.S. 415 (2009); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009). 
288. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). The enclaves are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7, and the scheme was 
upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294-97 (1958). 
289. Statement About Policy on Abortions at Military Base Hospitals in the United 
States, 3 PUB. PAPERS 500 (Apr. 3, 1971); see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before 
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This is a good thing. Interstitial lawmaking is a reflection of federalism, 
and federalism provides a structure for pluralism. Federalist political theorists 
argue that decentralized government provides a framework for individuals and 
communities to flourish.291 Tocqueville observed that “[i]n large centralized 
nations the lawgiver is bound to give the laws a uniform character which does 
not fit the diversity of places and of mores.”292 Interstitial law is an attempt to 
accommodate that diversity by having federal law take on less of that “uniform 
character.” 
It may seem odd to praise interstitial law as promoting federalism. After 
all, if local decisionmaking is so great, why tolerate the federal overlay at all? 
On the flipside, if the topic is one that requires federal action, why hitch that 
federal action to state law, thereby creating what Chief Justice Marshall dis-
missed as “a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the States 
. . . . which might disappoint its most important designs”?293  
The response is that interstitial law is a form of compromise. It is a nod, on 
the one hand, to the fact that very few subjects—if any—are “truly local,” in 
the sense that no federal intervention is permissible or desirable.294 Yet it as-
pires to maintain aspects of that localism where doing so is possible. Interstitial 
law is also, of course, subject to overriding federal limitations. So if the under-
lying state laws are ultimately held unconstitutional, the federal system will in-
validate them and no longer defer to them. 
Sometimes interstitial law concerns high-salience issues that are the subject 
of vicious interstate contestation. In such a case, interstitial law can serve the 
coordinating or supervising function of the federal government without entirely 
embroiling the federal government in the merits of the case. 
Same-sex marriage, of course, is one such example. Scholars have written 
about the virtues of federalism in family law.295 Popular writers have also ar-
gued that states should each be able to decide for themselves whether to allow 
same-sex marriage,296 and DOMA’s author has called for repealing DOMA 
 
(and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2053-54 
(2011). 
290. For more, see Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294-96; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 804 n.29, 
816-20; Pathak, supra note 12, at 834-47; Note, supra note 5, at 1222-29. 
291. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 320-23 (1974). 
292. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 161 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1835). 
293. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819). 
294. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 
111 YALE L.J. 619, 643-56 (2001). 
295. Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 103, at 566, 601; Michael E. Solimine, Competi-
tive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 84-96 
(1998). 
296. E.g., Jonathan Rauch, Saying No to “I Do,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at A8; 
David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Conservatives: Keep Gay Marriage out of the Courts, 
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and returning to interstitial federal law on that very basis.297 To be sure, it may 
not be possible for the federal government to truly extricate itself from the con-
flict, because (as we have seen) contestation over the structural rules is hard to 
completely separate from substance. At the same time, the two can be separated 
at least somewhat—so that any contestation at the national level need not im-
mediately replicate the full extent of the state contest. 
The very different context of slavery might provide another example of 
high-salience interstitial law. Until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
states decided whether to be “slave” or “free,” and states decided how a per-
son’s status could be changed—for example, by traveling through (or to) a new 
territory.298 But federal law necessarily interacted with the state slave regime. 
For instance, the Constitution expressly dealt with fugitive slaves, providing 
that a slave who escaped to a free state could not be “discharged from such 
Service or Labour” by any “Law or Regulation therein,” and requiring free 
states to honor the owner’s request to “deliver[] up” an escaped slave.299  
The Fugitive Slave Clause was interstitial—the clause applied only to those 
actually “held to Service or Labour,”300 in marked contrast to the Extradition 
Clause, which applied to all those “charged” with crime.301 So application of 
the federal rule required a determination of whether the target was a slave or 
not—the subject of two fugitive slave statutes and plenty of litigation. Federal 
judges certainly did not extricate themselves from the issue of slavery: the fugi-
tive slave acts were controversial,302 provoking a near-insurrection in Wiscon-
 
ditions has been the province of the state legislatures. And it should have remained that 
way.”); Steve Chapman, A Federalist Case for Gay Marriage, REASON (Apr. 27, 2009), 
http://reason.com/archives/2009/04/27/a-federalist-case-for-gay-marr; see also Franklin 
Foer, The Joy of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 7 (Book Review), at 12 (canvass-
ing other such arguments). 
297. Barr, supra note 42. 
298. Compare Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 207 (1836) (holding a 
slave is made free if travelling with master “staying some time, but not acquiring a domicil 
here”), with Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 477 (1820) (finding the Northwest 
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Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15, 15 (1821) (holding that a slave passing through a 
free state “for a mere transitory purpose . . . does not thereby acquire a right to freedom”). 
For further discussion, see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 87-99 (1975) (discussing these and other cases); PAUL FINKELMAN, 
AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, COMITY 89, 103-125, 187-200 (1981); Bruce 
E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Re-
gimes in a Federalist System, 62 ALA. L. REV. 111, 148-50 (2010). See generally Strader v. 
Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851) (leaving this dispute to state law). 
299. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
300. Id. 
301. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.  
302. See, e.g., Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229-30 (1847); Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-18 (1842). For criticism, see AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 262-63 (2005). 
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sin,303 and that is without getting into the (non-interstitial) issue of slavery in 
the territories.304 Yet the interstitial nature of federal law nonetheless allowed 
many federal officials to skirt the core controversies much of the time—for bet-
ter or worse. 
But interstitial law exists in less salient areas, as well. As Hart observed: 
Federal tax law, for example, can say what state-created interests are to be 
taxed, and can characterize them in any way it chooses; but it cannot create the 
interests. Similarly, federal bankruptcy law can dissolve state-created interests 
in any way it thinks equitable; but it is hard to see how it can create, or recog-
nize in liquidation, interests which never had any existence under state law.305 
Interstitial law allows federal courts to sidestep technical, complicated is-
sues where federal law provides inadequate guideposts for reliable 
decisionmaking. In such cases, it is not that interstitial law outsources political 
controversy; it is simply that it outsources complexity.306 
Some have criticized interstitial law in various contexts—suggesting, for 
example, that it is inconsistent with the Constitution’s reference to “uniform” 
federal bankruptcy laws,307 or that it is “difficult and expensive” to adjudicate 
state legal status as part of a social security determination.308 To the extent 
those arguments draw on a view that interstitial law is anomalous or without 
benefits, I think that view is mistaken. Interstitial law is a valuable part of our 
federal system. 
It is worth adding two caveats about conditions that are likely necessary for 
such interstitial law to work reliably. One is that the importance of the federal 
aspect of the law must not be too great in relation to that of the state aspect. The 
goal is to make federal law account for a state’s choices, not to put the state in 
control of federal law. Nobody suspects, for example, that states will opportun-
istically modify or redefine their own definitions of marriage purely in order to 
affect the scope of federal benefits—the nonfederal aspects of marriage are too 
important.  
 
303. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854) (attempting to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act), 
rev’d Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859); see also ; COVER, supra note 
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1836-64, in 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 653-75 (Paul A. 
Freund ed., 1974) (same); Jeffrey Schmitt, Note, Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States’ 
Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315, 1323-42 (2007) (same). 
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306. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
103, 133-38 (2008). 
307. Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON HALL 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 62-64), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1967905. 
308. Brief in Opposition at 14, Astrue v. Capato, No. 11-159 (U.S. May 21, 2012), 2011 
WL 5014750 (cert. granted).  
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A related condition is that interstitial law generally relies on the state treat-
ing federal and state law alike. To see why, consider the recent litigation be-
tween Wyoming and the federal government over Wyomingites’ firearms 
rights.309 Federal law provides that domestic violence misdemeanants lose the 
right to carry a gun.310 Domestic violence misdemeanors tend to be state law 
crimes, so the federal law is a form of interstitial law—it depends on state crim-
inal categories to define the scope of the federal ban. Federal law also allows 
misdemeanants to regain their right to use a gun if their conviction is “ex-
punged or set aside” under state law.311 Apparently unhappy with the reach of 
the federal ban, Wyoming passed a law setting up special-purpose 
expungements of these misdemeanors, which expunged the convictions only 
“for the purposes of restoring any firearm rights lost.”312 The Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms was unimpressed and rejected these special-
purpose expungements, and the Tenth Circuit ultimately upheld the ATF’s po-
sition.313 Statutory niceties aside, it is easy to see why: Under Wyoming’s posi-
tion, federal law would not have been borrowing a general rule of state law so 
much as delegating authority over firearms entirely to the state. Or as the Unit-
ed States’ brief put it, the Wyoming statute was an attempt to “circumvent the 
Brady Act’s background check requirement by treating as an ‘expungement’ an 
action that purports only to remove federal firearms disabilities with no accom-
panying state-law consequences.”314 
B. Conflicts and Federalism 
Aside from the mechanics of Hart’s interstitial law, there is a lesson for the 
field of conflicts more broadly. The uncertain or contested state of modern con-
flicts doctrine makes it hard for the field to do its job. 
Conflicts cases are about boundaries—both territorial boundaries, and 
more generally the boundaries between different entities’ lawmaking authority. 
Other substantive legal areas implicitly rely on conflicts doctrine whenever 
they allocate decisionmaking authority to a particular level, assuming that con-
flicts doctrine will sort out which entity at that level has authority. As we have 
seen, the proposal to leave marriage to state law assumes a relatively well-
settled answer about which state.  
 
309. See generally Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
310. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). 
311. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). 
312. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1501(a) (2008). That proviso was eliminated after the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision. See Firearm Ownership—Domestic Violence Offenses, 2009 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws 154. 
313. Crank, 539 F.3d at 1244-49. 
314. Brief of United States at 19, Crank, 539 F.3d 1236 (No. 07-8046), 2007 WL 
4732294. 
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In conflicts, however, the answers are frequently not well settled. Modern 
conflicts doctrines are frequently more like standards than rules, diminishing 
the relevance of bright lines (like state borders) and instead emphasizing con-
nections, interests, and expectations. But this is not just about rules and stand-
ards. It is frequently doubted which rule or standard should obtain, and even 
when a given state settles on one rule or standard, there is no guarantee that 
other states will agree. The point of conflicts doctrine is to resolve apparent 
disputes between different laws. When states apply different doctrines they do 
not resolve the dispute but instead push it up a level. Borders aren’t bright lines 
any more if the territory is disputed; domicile doesn’t work if the states define 
it differently, and general frameworks like the First or Second Restatements 
don’t work if the states pick different ones, or apply them differently. As we 
have seen, layering other institutions, like the federal courts, on top of this dis-
agreement exacerbates the problem even further. 
To be sure, some conflicts doctrines are less messy than others. DOMA 
happens to present a perfect storm of unclear rules, institutional disagreement, 
and unclear institutional authority. Yet many other areas present at least some 
of these problems. And of course every field of law must confront a certain de-
gree of uncertainty and disagreement. But the uncertainty and disagreement in 
conflicts doctrine is unusually problematic. It is not just that conflicts is unusu-
ally confused—though I suspect it is—it is that conflicts occupies a special, 
“meta” role. 
Perhaps all law is a tool for social ends. Conflicts is a meta-tool, a tool for 
the ends of other legal doctrine. Whatever the optimal level of uncertainty in 
substantive doctrines, the meta-uncertainty of conflicts doctrine skews those 
doctrines toward chaos. And it does so in a way unlikely to be useful to any-
body, introducing more chaos in cases that happen to develop connections to 
multiple jurisdictions. As a practical matter, whatever ends one wants a given 
domestic law to serve, unsettled conflicts doctrine makes it harder for that law 
to serve them. If a law sacrifices fairness for clarity, it is undermined when  
conflicts takes away the clarity that was the entire point of the 
sacrifice. And if a law makes the reverse decision, by choosing an open-ended 
standard, the factors to which it gives weight might be different from those that 
are unpredictably applied in cases of conflict. The problem with meta-
uncertainty is not just that it diminishes certainty overall, but that it deprives 
lawmakers of the assurance that their chosen way to resolve each individual 
problem will be effectuated. For any substantive end, there is a special interest 
in keeping the plumbing clear.315 
Uncertainty in the law means freedom for the courts. There is surely a 
temptation to embrace this freedom, to use the flexibility of conflicts doctrine 
to reach a result that seems fair for the individual case. I hope the lesson of 
DOMA shows that flexibility has costs. Conflicts is not just an esoteric tool for 
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individual private law cases, or a subfield of civil procedure; it is an implicit 
premise of much of federalism, and hence of much of public law.  
When the rules are uncertain ex ante, then they will be clouded by politics 
and narrow instrumentalism in every case. Federalism may or may not be de-
sirable for any given issue, but if any kind of devolution is to be possible, con-
flicts doctrine is what enables it. 
 Public law has largely ignored conflicts as a field. And in an ideal world, it 
would be able to. Conflicts doctrine would quietly resolve the edge cases of 
federalism, and public law could proceed to the seemingly more important 
business of governing our nation. But conflicts doctrine is not set up to do that 
now, and public lawyers cannot afford to ignore it. 
CONCLUSION 
In briefing the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA before the First Cir-
cuit’s decision in Gill, both sides briefly adverted to the choice-of-law prob-
lems likely to arise without DOMA. The defenders of the statute argued that 
DOMA was needed because otherwise “confusion would arise regarding same-
sex couples who marry in a state or foreign country where such marriages are 
permitted but reside in a state that does not recognize foreign same-sex mar-
riages.”316 The challengers responded that the problem was nothing new: “Fed-
eral agencies must often address far more complicated differences among the 
domestic relations laws of the states . . . . The suggestion that they would be 
unable to do the same thing for married same-sex couples . . . defies belief.”317 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the truth is someplace in between. The court’s opinion 
did not discuss the issue, but it cannot be avoided forever. The demise of 
DOMA will unleash federal choice-of-law problems that have evaded resolu-
tion for years. But ultimately the problems can and should be resolved. 
More broadly, DOMA’s demise may in fact be an opportunity for creative 
destruction: the framework for solving the DOMA problem applies more 
broadly to all instances of federal laws that draw upon state law. Federal insti-
tutions can and should devise a set of choice-of-law rules, and what set of rules 
is proper will depend on which institution adopts them. Congress has genera-
tive power, while federal courts have only interpretive power. Congress can 
sweep aside existing choice-of-law rules and replace them with the policies of 
its choosing. Courts must work within existing guideposts, and justify their 
work on more neutral grounds. 
Finally, DOMA provides a lesson about the ignored field of conflicts of 
law. Public law treats conflicts as a technical backwater, assuming that whatev-
er substantive federalism decisions are made can be executed by the relevant 
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conflicts rule. That is not always so; indeed, it is often not so. Perhaps that can 
be changed. Until then, public law ignores conflicts at its own peril. 
